United Nations A/69/855–S/2015/228

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
2 April 2015
English
Original: Arabic

General Assembly
Sixty-ninth session
Agenda item 107
Measures to eliminate international terrorism

Security Council
Seventieth year

Identical letters dated 1 April 2015 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I should like to convey to you the following information:

On Tuesday, 31 March 2015, terrorist groups carried out a barbaric attack against the village of Mab'ujah in the countryside of Salamiyah. In that attack, the terrorists committed a horrific massacre of the village's peaceful residents, killing more than 60 civilians, the majority of whom were children and women, and gravely injuring dozens of others. The dead had either had their throats cut or had been shot. The terrorist gangs also abducted some of the villagers after they had broken into the peaceful homes of the village and looted, ransacked and burned them.

This latest massacre, which was perpetrated in the peaceful village of Mab'ujah, is a continuation of the savage, systematic acts of terrorism that are being committed in Syria by armed terrorist groups. Certain States, in the service of their own narrow interests, insist on referring to those groups as the "moderate opposition". Those groups include such organizations as Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, the Nusrah Front, the Free Army, Army of Islam and the Islamic Front. Those States therefore intentionally ignore the crimes committed by these groups, which have made it their vocation to kill and slaughter the peaceful civilians of the Syrian Arab Republic and to mutilate their corpses. The Syrian Arab Republic stresses that such acts of terrorism would not occur were it not for the ongoing, direct support that those terrorist groups, which espouse an exclusionary Wahhabist ideology, receive from countries that shamelessly call themselves the "friends of the Syrian people". Their friendship has caused Syrian civilians to be killed, slaughtered, burned, starved and deprived of water, electricity, food and shelter.

The massacres and the crimes against humanity committed by armed terrorist groups, the latest of which was the Mab'ujah massacre, makes it imperative for, indeed, incumbent on, peace-loving States to take punitive measures against those States that support and fund the indiscriminate terrorism that has been directed

against Syria and its people for more than four years. The international community is now called on to reaffirm its commitment to combat terrorism and extremist terrorist groups by cooperating and coordinating fully with the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic in the fight against this dangerous blight. It must also provide support to the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic, which is today combating terrorism on behalf of all the peoples of the world, in order to defend humanity, justice, freedom and dignity, and keep at bay the evils of extremism, blind fanaticism and destructive, tyrannical ideology.

The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic affirms its resolve to combat terrorism in Syria and its determination to continue fulfilling its duty to defend the Syrian people and protect it from anything that might threaten its security and safety. It once again calls on the Security Council and the Secretary-General to condemn this criminal act. It also reiterates its call for the Council to shoulder its responsibility to counter terrorism and eliminate its root causes by enforcing implementation of its resolutions on counter-terrorism, including resolutions 2170 (2014), 2178 (2014) and 2199 (2015). The Council should furthermore take every forceful measure possible against those who violate the above-mentioned resolutions by continuing to arm, fund, shelter and train armed terrorist groups, including the regimes of Turkey, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, as well as France and certain other Western countries.

I should be grateful if the present letter could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 107, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Haydar **Ali Ahmad**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

United Nations S/2015/229

Security Council

Distr.: General
1 April 2015

Original: English

I. Partnering for peace: moving towards partnership peacekeeping

Introduction

1. In its resolution 2167 (2014), the Security Council requested that I prepare, in close consultation with the African Union Commission and the European Union, and no later than 31 March 2015, an assessment report and recommendations on the progress of the partnerships between the United Nations and relevant regional organizations in peacekeeping operations. Within the framework of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, the assessment and recommendations included in the present report build on and complement my previous reports on cooperation with regional organizations, including, more recently, my reports on United Nations-African Union cooperation in peace and security (S/2011/805) and on cooperation between the United Nations and regional and other organizations (S/2014/560) and my letter to the President of the Security Council on the transitions from the African Union peace operations to United Nations peacekeeping operations in Mali and the Central African Republic (S/2015/3). They are also guided by the positions and areas of interest of the Council as outlined in resolution 2167 (2014) and in its presidential statements on cooperation with the African Union (S/PRST/2014/27) and the European Union (S/PRST/2014/4).

2. The scope of the present report covers primarily the partnership with regional organizations and arrangements in peacekeeping, rather than the whole spectrum of peace and security actions. It is focused largely on the partnerships with the African Union and the European Union, the two organizations that are explicitly mentioned in paragraph 28 of resolution 2167 (2014) and are currently the closest partners of the United Nations in respect of peacekeeping efforts. Other regional and subregional organizations and arrangements are mentioned in relevant areas, where they have engaged on peacekeeping issues and in peacekeeping operations.

II. Trends related to peacekeeping partnerships

3. The demand for peacekeeping has grown over the past decade. The bulk of the peacekeeping efforts are undertaken in Africa, with over 87 per cent of United Nations peacekeepers deployed on the continent. At the same time, peacekeeping is facing a shifting conflict dynamic, characterized by increasing regionalization and globalization, as well as, at times, the presence of unconventional threats, in particular from extremist groups operating side by side with criminal groups and parties to the conflict. Recently, a majority of peacekeepers have been operating in

Please recycle

places where there is little peace to keep and where robust action is often required to implement mandates on the protection of civilians.

4. In that context, the engagement of regional partners in peacekeeping alongside United Nations operations has become the norm rather than the exception. Nowhere is this fact more evident than in Africa, where the engagement of the African Union and subregional mechanisms, as well as the European Union, alongside United Nations operations, is present throughout all phases of the conflict. At the moment, there are nine United Nations peacekeeping operations on the continent, six peace support operations led by the African Union and regional economic communities/regional mechanisms, one hybrid United Nations-African Union operation, and nine European Union civilian missions and military operations. The models of such multilateral engagement are each time adapted to fit the specific circumstances of the crisis in question.

5. Over the years, those models have shaped a shared understanding of the comparative advantages of each organization and a desired division of labour among them. In the recent cases of Mali and the Central African Republic, the African Union took over the operations initiated by subregional actors, to be later rehatted as United Nations operations. In both cases, the United Nations and the European Union were engaged in supporting the deployment of the African Union-led operations. In Mali, following the transfer of authority from the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), the African Union has retained a political role with the establishment of the African Union Mission for Mali and the Sahel (MISAHEL), which has continued supporting the inter-Malian inclusive dialogue. In the Central African Republic, following the transfer of authority from the African-led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic (MISCA) to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), the African Union, through MISAC, and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) have continued to play a key role in the ongoing transition and stabilization of the country. Also in both cases, the European Union has deployed its own, smaller and well-targeted common security and defence policy presences, alongside African Union or United Nations-led operations, with either a training and advisory mandate or a mandate that serves to bridge the gap between missions.

6. Those patterns, as well as other successful cases of cooperation, such as in Somalia, may provide a framework for a further rationalization of efforts in future cases. For example, the numerous cases of simultaneous United Nations, African Union and European Union engagements on the continent demonstrate that all three organizations can contribute necessary peacekeeping capacities and solutions to crises and post-conflict situations. In many cases, all three also play important roles in support of the political and mediation processes, along with other actors. Nevertheless, the potential for closer trilateral engagement and cooperation among the United Nations, the African Union and the European Union has yet to be fully explored and exploited.

7. There is little question that United Nations partnerships with regional actors in peacekeeping have reached a considerable level of maturity and complexity in recent years. The proliferation of actors and models of engagement has presented

both a challenge, in respect of avoiding a fragmentation of efforts, duplication or competition, and an opportunity, in respect of mobilizing as efficiently as possible the collective leverage and comparative advantages of different organizations in attaining shared peace and security objectives. The sections below provide a review of the institutional mechanisms and initiatives in place, which are aimed at maximizing that opportunity, as well as a review of the ways in which the mechanisms have worked in practice in various countries and thematic areas.

III. Coordination and consultation mechanisms

Strategic-level mechanisms

8. Effective and efficient partnerships in peacekeeping depend on the alignment of strategic and political objectives between different peacekeeping actors, from the early planning and pre-mandate stages of their operations to their transition or exit. This in turn is dependent on effective cooperation between their decision-making organs. In some challenging cases, it may be difficult to achieve a clear strategic direction within one organization, let alone among a number of organizations with different memberships and perspectives, and whose relationships are only loosely defined, in the overall context of the primary responsibility of the Security Council for peace and security.

The United Nations and the African Union

9. The entry into force of the Protocol relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union in December 2003 substantially strengthened the powers of the African Union in matters of conflict prevention and resolution. Since then, the African Union and the regional economic communities/regional mechanisms have been increasingly taking initiatives on peace and security, and their role in those areas has grown, both qualitatively and quantitatively. As a result, the partnership between the United Nations and the African Union has evolved from a capacity-building model to a partnership based on strategic convergence.

10. Article 17 of the Protocol relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union recognizes the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of peace and security. In practice, since 2007 the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union have established closer links, including through the holding of annual joint consultative meetings. Both organs have underlined their commitment to the development of a stronger and more structured relationship, through enhanced information-sharing, synergies in planning and monitoring, joint assessments and strategies to increase the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations. The practical implementation of those commitments, however, has materialized slowly.

11. The consultative meetings have yet to lead to more aligned political decisions on specific issues between the two organizations, whose processes for decision-making differ significantly. The challenge of reaching institutional synchronization and a clear understanding on the level of consultation required between the two bodies has sometimes led to incoherent political responses. That challenge has been compounded by the lack of a clear division of labour between the regional economic

communities/regional mechanisms and the African Union with regard to peace and security issues in Africa. In my recent letter to the President of the Security Council on the lessons learned exercise on transitions (S/2015/3), I underscored the importance of political coherence and the harmonization of policy and strategies at the highest levels.

12. In the Central African Republic, the strategic convergence among the partners involved was facilitated to a large extent by the common vision that was provided by the Security Council at an early stage and in several resolutions, in which the Secretariat was requested to undertake, in consultation with the African Union and other regional partners, contingency planning for the transformation of the African Union peace operation into a United Nations peacekeeping mission. By contrast, in Mali, divisions among Member States and the relevant organs at the international, regional and subregional levels, and within the Secretariat, on the appropriate way forward weakened the ability of the peacekeeping partners to jointly establish a clear and commonly acceptable road map for the resolution of the crisis.

13. A harmonized strategic approach, including a shared strategic vision of the objectives for the deployment of a peacekeeping mission from the outset, is also critical in the case of a hybrid mission such as the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). Whereas views regarding the desirability of the hybrid models may differ, it is clear that they should be anchored in close formal and informal consultations between the United Nations and the African Union at the inception and throughout the life of such missions. When the strategic objectives and visions of the two organizations on the resolution of the conflict or on the required engagement with the parties start to differ, a hybrid mission such as UNAMID loses its political leverage on the parties and its ability to implement its mandate.

14. The lessons learned exercise on the transitions in the Central African Republic and in Mali has demonstrated that the African elected members of the Security Council (the African three) can play a pivotal role in enhancing coordination and synergy between the two Councils. In February 2014, the Peace and Security Council of the African Union formally endorsed the establishment of that mechanism in New York and the Permanent Observer Mission of the African Union to the United Nations as the secretariat of the mechanism. The mechanism can help to ensure that the voices of the African Union and of relevant regional economic communities are heard in the debates and decisions of the Security Council and therefore support the creation of a unified vision among the Security Council, the Peace and Security Council of the African Union and relevant regional economic communities.

15. The United Nations Secretariat and the African Union Commission have deepened their partnership. The United Nations-African Union Joint Task Force on Peace and Security has proved to be an important instrument in fostering greater coherence, allowing the Secretariat and the Commission to coordinate immediate and long-term strategic issues of common interest and identify areas for concerted action.

16. The establishment of the United Nations Office to the African Union (UNOAU) in 2010 has also been instrumental in advancing the peacekeeping partnership between the two organizations. It has been carrying out a dual role of working with the African Union in supporting the planning and management of

current operations and the development of policies, while supporting the development of institutional capacities in the service of the partnership, with a particular focus on the operationalization of the African Peace and Security Architecture.

17. At the political level, close and consistent consultation mechanisms between the United Nations and regional actors are also essential in achieving greater strategic and political convergence, including in support of peacekeeping mandates. The Support and Follow-up Group on the Situation in Mali, co-chaired by the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the United Nations, and comprising the European Union and the International Contact Group on the Central African Republic, co-chaired by the African Union and the Congo, have been effective in ensuring coordination among stakeholders in support of the peace process in those countries. They have also helped to create an enabling environment for the implementation of the mandates of MINUSMA and MINUSCA.

18. Other political and mediation arrangements being carried out in conjunction with United Nations peacekeeping activities include the African Union High-level Implementation Panel, which leads the engagement and mediation efforts on the Sudan and between the Sudan and South Sudan, and is supported by the United Nations Special Envoy for the Sudan and South Sudan and the African Union-United Nations Joint Special Representative for Darfur. The teams jointly strategize, undertake joint missions and, when necessary, jointly address the Peace and Security Council of the African Union and the Security Council of the United Nations. Similarly, in South Sudan, my Special Envoy for the Sudan and South Sudan and my Special Representative for South Sudan work in close consultation with the Intergovernmental Authority on Development in the mediation process and engage the African Union Commission senior leadership and Member States in support of the Authority on a regular basis.

The United Nations and the European Union

19. Strategic-level communication and coordination between the United Nations and the European Union on peacekeeping and crisis management is carried out in various formats. The Security Council holds biannual informal meetings with the Political and Security Committee of the European Union, at which peacekeeping and other peace and security issues are discussed. These serve as important forums for the exchange of information, but usually fall short of establishing a convergence of views on appropriate action in particular peacekeeping contexts. With regard to mandates, when the Common Security and Defence Policy operations of the European Union deploy in United Nations peacekeeping contexts, coordination usually takes place through members of the Security Council. The members help to ensure that such missions are referred to in Security Council resolutions and are complementary to the broader mandates of peacekeeping operations, whether led by the United Nations or by the African Union.

20. A number of other high-level United Nations-European Union strategic discussions are held, which involve the Secretariat and complement efforts in this regard, including the regular briefings by the High Representative of the Union of Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to the Security Council and briefings by senior United Nations officials to the Political and Security Committee in Brussels and the

biannual United Nations-European Union Steering Committee on Crisis Management, co-chaired by the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping and the Deputy Secretary-General of the European External Action Service. The latter allows for more detailed discussions on peacekeeping issues while providing opportunities for strategic alignment on such issues as the division of labour, political messaging and exit strategies. Strategic-level communication is further facilitated by the European Union delegation to the United Nations in New York and the establishment, in 2011, of the United Nations Liaison Office for Peace and Security in Brussels.

21. Three important documents have also continued to provide a cross-cutting strategic framework for the relationship with the European Union in peacekeeping and crisis management: the 2003 Joint Declaration on United Nations-European Union Cooperation in Crisis Management; the 2007 joint statement on United Nations-European Union Cooperation in Crisis Management; and the plan of action to enhance European Union Common Security and Defence Policy support to United Nations peacekeeping (European Union plan of action), adopted by the Political and Security Committee of the European Union in 2012. The latter identified the priorities for United Nations-European Union cooperation in peacekeeping that had been pursued jointly by the two organizations over the past two years, including seeking enhanced uniformed contributions by European Union member States; coordination during planning; cooperation in respect of policy and guidance; and lessons learned and training. Discussions are under way on the adoption of a follow-up framework on cooperation, based on the previous framework, but renewing the commitment and re-establishing related priorities, in line with more recent experiences.

The United Nations and other regional organizations and arrangements

22. Besides the African Union, subregional organizations in Africa and the European Union, there have been few cases in recent years in which strategic coordination has taken place in the context of the deployment of a peacekeeping operation. A notable example is the Syrian Arab Republic, where, following the escalation of the crisis, the United Nations cooperated with the League of Arab States (LAS), primarily at the political and mediation levels, leading up to the deployment of the United Nations Supervision Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic (UNSMIS). In particular, in February 2012 agreement was reached on a joint diplomatic effort between LAS and the United Nations, with the appointment of the first Joint United Nations-League of Arab States Special Envoy to Syria. The efforts of the Joint Special Envoy led to the adoption by the Security Council of resolution 2042 (2012), which sets out the six-point plan. The plan provided the basis for the deployment of UNSMIS, with the aim of observing and reporting on the cessation of the violence. With conflict escalating across the country, however, the UNSMIS mandate ended in July 2012, following the fate of an earlier mission comprising 67 LAS monitors.

Operational-level mechanisms

23. Beyond strategic-level discussions, operational coordination is crucial to building the common understanding that contributes to strategic-level decision-making and to ensuring the effective and coherent implementation of mandates on the ground. It involves a number of actors on all sides, including the teams producing and harmonizing analysis, and planning or backstopping the operations once deployed; and the mechanisms through which coherence is achieved not only between the missions operating in parallel or engaged in rehatting, but also with other entities on the ground.

The United Nations and the African Union

24. To date, the United Nations and the African Union have worked together at the operational level on the ground in five peacekeeping contexts, namely, Burundi, the Central African Republic, Mali, Somalia and Darfur, the Sudan. Cooperation in those countries/areas has largely shaped the peacekeeping partnership between the two organizations at the operational level. Within that partnership, the model most used has been that of sequential deployment, transitioning from an African Union-led operation to a United Nations operation. In such cases, operational cooperation takes place through the provision of support to the African Union during the planning phases of its operations, as well as during their deployment, and later on through close cooperation to ensure an efficient transition to and rehatting as a United Nations operation.

25. Somalia represents a successful example of joint planning, especially in view of the Security Council position on the potential transition from the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to a United Nations peacekeeping operation at the appropriate time. Collaboration in the field on the 2012 strategic concept for AMISOM succeeded in revitalizing the African Union-United Nations strategic partnership and led to an increase in the AMISOM troop level endorsed by the Peace and Security Council of the African Union and the Security Council of the United Nations. The 2013 joint African Union-United Nations assessment mission reinforced that collaboration through the establishment of shared strategic objectives and benchmarks. The outcome of the mission was the development of three options for the way forward, one of which was endorsed by both Councils. The broad consultations and inclusion of key partners paved the way for agreement and swift implementation of the joint recommendations. A second joint African Union-United Nations review of AMISOM and the Somalia National Security Forces is scheduled to take place in April 2015.

26. Two recent examples of sequential African Union-United Nations deployments are AFISMA in 2012, followed by MINUSMA in 2013; and MISCA in 2013, followed by MINUSCA in 2014. In the latter case, the United Nations worked from the outset to support the transition of authority from the ECCAS-led Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in the Central African Republic (MICOPAX) to MISCA, and participated in the African Union-led assessment missions, as early as in April 2013. The United Nations provided technical and expert advice on the planning and deployment of MISCA, the strengthening of MISCA command and control and the building of its administrative infrastructure and training capacity. Following the adoption of resolution 2149 (2014), the United Nations and the African Union developed a transition plan, operationalized by a team in coordination with MISCA

and the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA), thus contributing to a smoother transition. For example, the establishment of a joint MISCA-MINUSCA coordination forum on the protection of civilians in Bangui as part of transition planning efforts helped to avoid a vacuum in the implementation of the protection of civilians mandate.

27. Close operational cooperation should also be a key element in the force and police generation processes in the case of sequential deployments. In respect of both the Central African Republic and Mali, although clarity on United Nations requirements for rehatting was established at an early stage, following the decisions for the transition, the capabilities of the AFISMA and MISCA troops inherited by the successor United Nations missions — in terms of equipment and self-sustainment, as well as in terms of training — did not match relevant United Nations standards. While lower standards are sometimes inherent in the rapid deployment of enforcement operations in Africa, rehatting can be more successful through United Nations-African Union collaboration in respect of facilitating the fulfilment of United Nations standards during the transition of uniformed personnel to African Union missions that are expected to be rehatted.

28. The United Nations also continues to coordinate with the African Union in providing support to enhance the African Union Regional Task Force, a component of the Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord's Resistance Army. At the request of the African Union Commission, the United Nations sent a multidisciplinary team of experts to Yaoundé in February 2015 to support the development of the strategic concept of operations towards the operationalization of the multinational joint task force initiative against Boko Haram. The Force Intervention Brigade in the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) represents another creative model of operational collaboration between the two organizations, with the United Nations following up on what began as a regional initiative to resolve the crisis in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and established the Force Intervention Brigade within MONUSCO in 2013.

The United Nations and the European Union

29. Operational cooperation with the European Union in different peacekeeping settings, including, most recently, the Central African Republic, as well as the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Mali, has usually been based on a clear division of labour, aimed at ensuring the most efficient use of the capacities and resources of each organization. In the start-up planning phases, in which coordination is crucial to ensuring complementarity and avoiding duplication, or seamless transitions logistically and operationally, recent examples have demonstrated the progress made in the United Nations partnership with the European Union over the past few years. Starting in Mali and later in the Central African Republic, operational planning for MINUSMA, the European Union military mission to contribute to the training of the Malian Armed Forces (EUTM) and the European Union Common Security and Defence Policy mission in Mali (EUCAP Sahel Mali) took place in a consultative manner with the European Union. The United Nations-European Union guidelines for coordination during the planning for respective operations, envisaged in the European Union plan of action, were tested in Mali for EUCAP Sahel Mali as well as to facilitate a successful transfer of security tasks from the European Union military operation in the Central

African Republic (EUFOR RCA) to MINUSCA and the deployment of the European Union Military Advisory Mission in the Central African Republic earlier in March in the Central African Republic. Further to those guidelines, the United Nations and the European Union plan to look jointly at the lessons learned in the transition and handover from the European Union operation to the United Nations in the Central African Republic and develop, as necessary, joint guidelines for similar transitions in the future. The experience of the handover of the European Union Ucatex camp to MINUSCA should also be positively acknowledged, and lessons from that exercise should be drawn for potential future cases in which the sharing of resources between the two organizations are needed.

30. Cooperation and coordination on the ground between United Nations and European Union missions and operations deployed in parallel have been efficient and regular in most country scenarios. Coordination mechanisms that have worked in different country settings include the establishment of liaison officers on the ground, co-location, arrangements for the exchange of classified information, and the participation of European Union representatives in coordinating structures led by the United Nations, in particular rule of law and security sector reform-related mechanisms that involve European Union civilian missions. In order to be effective, such mechanisms should always be backed by strong political will to engage in sharing and partnerships. In Kosovo,[1] United Nations-European Union cooperation should be further strengthened to ensure a more coordinated international engagement as the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) undergoes further restructuring.

31. Finally, in the light of the European Union delegation's prominent role in providing support for the justice sector and other institutions in post-crisis countries, close cooperation with the wider United Nations family in jointly setting related priorities has been crucial to the implementation of coherent institution-building strategies. For example, a close partnership has been developed between MINUSMA and the European Union delegation in Mali, which provided equipment and supported the refurbishment of a court in Timbuktu. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, seven prosecution support cells have been established by MONUSCO with European Union funding to assist national authorities in the prosecution of serious crimes.

32. With regard to exit strategies, there has been less of a culture of coordination between the two organizations, although both are committed to improving their engagement during the end phases of their respective missions. Unless there is a clear understanding of a transition from one organization to the other, the two organizations have been more inclined to conduct their own strategic reviews and decide on their drawdown and follow-on arrangements on the basis of limited consultation with their partners. For example, in the case of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the two organizations could have consulted more closely and at earlier stages in planning their respective reviews and transitions, although the level of engagement improved at the later stages of the process.

[1] References to Kosovo shall be understood to be in the context of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999).

The United Nations and other regional partners

33. Kosovo, in accordance with resolution 1244 (1999), represents an important example of United Nations operational coordination with other regional actors, in particular the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The OSCE Mission in Kosovo has enjoyed a long-standing relationship with the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) as its institution-building pillar, an arrangement that has allowed for close and constructive operational engagement throughout the years. The NATO International Security Force in Kosovo (KFOR), deployed as the international security presence alongside UNMIK, maintains some 5,000 troops on the ground and performs the role of the third emergency responder, after the Kosovo Police and EULEX. UNMIK and KFOR have enjoyed close cooperation, at the military liaison and head-of-mission levels, in the implementation of their respective mandates and on all operational issues, including in ensuring a stable environment in northern Kosovo and the protection of religious heritage sites.

IV. Capabilities and capacity-building support

34. The delivery of peacekeeping in partnership with regional actors should benefit from stronger partnership with regard to capability development. While major actors in the field of peacekeeping have been working separately on the development of their own capabilities, some synergies have been established on a bilateral basis. These are focused on the sharing of expertise between organizations, and the United Nations has been both a recipient and a provider of such expertise and assistance. A common priority has been and should continue to be to ensure that the capabilities developed can be used to facilitate the rapid response of the international community to unfolding crises.

The United Nations and the African Union

35. As the African Union takes up more responsibilities in peace operations, it has been faced with the challenges of acquiring the requisite capacity to plan, deploy and sustain such operations. While the African Union has been willing to deploy rapidly and even engage in combat operations despite the risk of casualties, it has not always been able to provide troops and police with the required training and capabilities in line with United Nations standards.

36. The African Union has been working towards establishing and operationalizing the African Standby Force (ASF) and, more recently, has begun developing the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises. The United Nations, through the United Nations Office to the African Union, is working closely with the African Union and the regional economic communities/regional mechanisms to support those efforts, accelerate the operationalization of ASF and the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises and improve the conceptualization, planning and management of African-led peace operations. Specifically, the Office has continued to support the African Union in the development and review of key policy and guiding documents, such as the doctrine issued by the African Union Peace Support Operations Division. The United Nations also continues to assist the African Union in the development of the police and rule of law elements of ASF as well as in the

implementation of the ASF road map III, including the AMANI Africa II training cycle activities.

37. Many of the long-standing challenges related to the capacity of the African Union to deploy and manage peace support operations in extremely difficult conditions and at short notice have yet to be overcome. However, both ASF and the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises have the potential to become effective rapid-response tools for the African Union and, by extension, for the United Nations. Once fully operational, those forces could provide a critical start-up capacity for responding to African crises as bridging mechanisms, as well as for providing enforcement action, if required. Alternatively, they could complement a United Nations peacekeeping operation when in extremis support is needed.

38. Beyond supporting the operationalization of ASF and the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises, the United Nations is engaged in building the capacities of the African Union and its member States in a number of key thematic areas related to peacekeeping. In particular, the United Nations Mine Action Service has supported the African Union in preparing a mine action and explosive remnants of war strategic framework for 2014-2017, aimed at enhancing the capacities of African Union member States and operations to deal with explosive threats. The United Nations and other partners, such as the World Bank, have also provided significant support to enhance the capacities of the African Union in the areas of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, security sector reform, human rights and child protection, including through secondment arrangements, institution-building programmes and the provision of technical assistance to civilian capacities in the African Union operations.

The United Nations and the European Union

39. Discussions with the European Union on capability development have been held in the context of United Nations efforts to expand its base of troop-contributing/police-contributing countries with additional European contributions, and in line with the relevant provisions of the European Union plan of action. States members of the European Union have indicated that contributions to United Nations peacekeeping should be discussed and determined on a bilateral basis, rather than through European Union-coordinated mechanisms. At the same time, the potential to "bundle" various European Union member State contributions into one package, potentially also combined with contributions from non-European Union members, in order to fill specific gaps in United Nations peacekeeping missions should not be underestimated. The European External Action Service has shown willingness to explore this issue further and to share capabilities with the Secretariat in respect of its expertise in specific areas, such as intelligence and rapid response.

40. With regard to rapid response, and the goal of the United Nations to deploy its operations more rapidly, the two organizations have been sharing experiences and information on their respective doctrine development. Discussions have been taking place on the possibility of deploying a European Union "battlegroup" as an autonomous rapid response force in support of or as a bridge to United Nations operations, including in specific country contexts. The battlegroup has yet to be deployed despite the potential offered by such a standing and rapidly deployable capacity. Discussions are expected to continue as European Union member States

reinforce their efforts to ensure that this valuable tool is used, and I encourage this process.

41. The European Union has also been committed to building the African capacity for peacekeeping and crisis prevention. Beyond the financial support provided to African Union operations, the funds in the European Union African Peace Facility have been used for capacity-building actions focused on the operationalization of the African Peace and Security Architecture. The 2014-2016 action programme of the African Peace Facility realigned the support provided by the Facility to the African Peace and Security Architecture in order to ensure more targeted support, including effective assistance to the upcoming AMANI Africa II training cycle activities, and support for activities dealing with strategic lift, communications and logistics. In addition, the European Union is preparing to launch a new "train and equip initiative" that will complement its training activities on the continent. In the light of the commitment of both the European Union and the United Nations to support African capacity, that is an area where increased triangular cooperation could be pursued.

The United Nations and other regional organizations and arrangements

42. NATO capabilities and expertise in dealing with asymmetric threats, in particular in Afghanistan, have resulted in new fields of United Nations-NATO cooperation. The United Nations can benefit from NATO expertise in specific areas and from its large network of training centres and centres of excellence, which could be used to support the United Nations in those areas. In particular, cooperation has been ongoing in respect of counter-improvised explosive device issues, including through an awareness-raising course for United Nations staff conducted by the centre of excellence in Madrid. Cooperation in 2015 will be focused on engagement with the centres of excellence on counter-improvised explosive device issues, military engineering and explosive ordnance disposal, on participation in joint exercises and on the conduct of a seminar on strategic and operational theory and practice regarding counter-improvised explosive device efforts.

43. The United Nations is willing to contribute to the efforts of other regional organizations to build up regional peacekeeping capacities. A concrete example of such cooperation is with the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which has been supported by the United Nations in the development of expertise and capabilities in peacekeeping over the past two years. Following a memorandum of understanding concluded between the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the CSTO secretariat on 28 September 2012, on strengthening cooperation between the two organizations, the United Nations organized briefings and shared material on United Nations peacekeeping policies and standards with CSTO officials engaged in the development of its 4,000-strong standby force. Most recently, Malaysia's announcement of the potential plans of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to establish a regional peacekeeping force could pave the way for increased cooperation with the Department, which is interested in supporting the endeavour.

V. Financing for peacekeeping

44. While regional organizations have the responsibility to secure their own resources, the need to enhance the predictability, sustainability and flexibility of financing for operations launched by a regional organization operating under a United Nations mandate remains a critical issue, particularly in cases of transition to a United Nations operation. In particular, the continued absence of predictable and sustainable funding has led to a number of limitations for the peace operations deployed by the African Union, which in turn have an impact on the overall ability of the international community to effectively respond to crises in Africa. The Peace Fund established by the African Union to support its peace support operations is inadequate to support the current demands of African Union peacekeeping. There are efforts under way to increase the allocation of African Union-assessed funding to its peace and security efforts; the January 2015 African Union Summit decided to allocate 25 per cent of the assessed contributions of African Union member States to peace operations. In the meantime, the African Union has been largely dependent on donor funding or, as in the case of Somalia, on United Nations-assessed contributions to launch and sustain its operations.

45. The largest source of external funding is the European Union African Peace Facility. Established in 2004, the Facility is the key instrument for facilitating the implementation of joint African Union-European Union priorities on peace and security, with a funding envelope of 750 million euros for the period 2014-2017, the vast majority of which is dedicated to supporting African-led peace operations. This financial support for African Union-led missions has been a predictable source of funding that has proved crucial to the African Union in planning and carrying out its operations. China and the United States of America are developing similar funding mechanisms to support the African Union, in addition to a range of smaller bilateral arrangements. African Union peace operations are also supported by direct bilateral support provided to their troop-contributing/police-contributing countries, which is particularly valuable in assisting the latter with improving their lethal equipment capabilities.

46. The United Nations has also developed various models to support African Union operations, including a mix of assessed funding and voluntary contributions, or voluntary contributions prior to transfer of authority to a United Nations peacekeeping operation. The largest and most developed funding model today is in Somalia, where the United Nations Support Office for the African Union Mission in Somalia (UNSOA) manages the disbursement of funds from the United Nations-assessed budget to provide logistical support to AMISOM. That model is complemented by a United Nations-managed trust fund, in accordance with resolution 1863 (2009). That logistical support package of assessed funding has been in place since 2009, with the provision of services and equipment necessitating the utilization of voluntary contributions to meet shortfalls. Following the adoption of resolution 2036 (2012), the shortfalls were also covered by assessed funding, leading to a significant decline in trust fund activity. The Security Council adopted resolution 2124 (2013), by which it created an additional trust fund for the provision of United Nations non-lethal logistical support to AMISOM and approximately 11,000 Somali National Army troops participating in joint operations, including for medical evacuation. That support has been complemented by substantial financial assistance from the European Union in respect of paying AMISOM troop, police and

civilian allowances and salaries directly through the Facility. As such, the Somalia experience represents a successful model of United Nations-African Union-European Union collaboration in this area.

47. Although the United Nations trust fund model to support African Union peace operations was also utilized in the Central African Republic and Mali, it encountered numerous challenges. Discussions to improve its use are under way, specifically in identifying ways to improve allocation and disbursement to the troop-contributing countries based on their priorities. The United Nations Trust Fund for Support to the African-led International Support Mission in Mali was established pursuant to resolution 2085 (2012). Contributions amounting to approximately $44 million were received, of which approximately $38 million in contributions were not earmarked, with the original intention to provide a mission support package and equipment to the various uniformed AFISMA components. Equipment worth approximately $12 million was deployed to Mali from the United Nations strategic deployment stocks. With the transfer of authority, options for providing support became limited given the United Nations obligation to support troop-contributing/police-contributing countries through assessed funding. On that basis, donors determined their preferences for the utilization of remaining balances, with the majority in support of counter-improvised explosive device efforts. Similarly, the United Nations Trust Fund in Support of the African-led International Mission in the Central African Republic was established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013). Contributions amounting to approximately $5 million have been received, to be used to provide strategic communications to MISCA prior to the transfer of authority, and catering and kitchen equipment to the current troop-contributing countries of MINUSCA.

48. As I highlighted in my recent letter to the President of the Council (S/2015/3), the experiences in the Central African Republic and Mali have confirmed that no funding or support modality is sufficient on its own. It thus appears that there is a need to mobilize a broad range of modalities in most cases, including a combination of voluntary, assessed and bilateral modalities, as appropriate. In that regard, I have called for a lessons learned exercise, to be jointly undertaken with the African Union, which will be aimed at reviewing and providing an assessment of the various mechanisms available to improve the predictability, sustainability and flexibility of financing for African Union peace operations authorized by the Security Council.

VI. Cooperation in policy development and training

49. Beyond capability development and rapid deployment, the United Nations has also increased its cooperation with regional organizations in respect of policy development in a number of key thematic areas. This has yet to lead to full harmonization of predeployment training standards, which is crucial to ensuring quick and effective rehatting processes, in cases of transition from one organization to another. It should be noted that cooperation in policy development does not necessarily translate into similar results and levels of implementation, as the latter also depends on the institutional culture, mechanisms and capacities of each organization.

Protection of civilians

50. In recent years, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations has worked with regional organizations on the development of guidance and conceptual frameworks for the protection of civilians. The Department was closely involved in the recent development of guidance on the issue for European Union military operations, for example. The African Union and the Department also engaged in close consultations regarding the development of guidance on the protection of civilians in the African Union context, but the guidance was never finalized. While consultations between the Department and the African Union endeavoured to ensure consistency between the concepts of the United Nations and the African Union in respect of the protection of civilians, it has become clear that one concept may not be sufficient, given that African Union and United Nations operations are often deployed in different operating environments. In Somalia, for example, AMISOM must focus on avoiding civilian casualties in the context of offensive operations, rather than proactively mitigating threats to vulnerable civilian populations. At the same time, African Union missions sometimes receive protection of civilians mandates that are similar to those of United Nations peacekeeping operations, as in the case of the Central African Republic. In such situations, a consistent approach on the protection of civilians greatly enhances the collective efforts and makes transitioning from one organization to the other easier for troops, police and civilian personnel. Given the likelihood of the deployment of African Union and United Nations operations, often sequentially, into situations in which civilian lives are at risk, greater work on formulating and, where possible, aligning the concepts would be a step in the right direction.

Women and peace and security

51. The United Nations Office to the African Union works with the African Union Commission on issues related to gender mainstreaming and women and peace and security, including in the development of policies and guidelines and in the conceptualization and planning of African Union-led operations. Collaboration on the agenda regarding women and peace and security is also well established with NATO. The two organizations have prioritized the development of common messaging and terminology on gender and conflict-related sexual violence in order to promote a harmonized approach to operationalizing the principles regarding women and peace and security in respective operations.

Police

52. The Policy on United Nations Police in Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions, promulgated by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support, defines the core functions of United Nations police and the fundamental principles guiding its activities. It was developed with the assistance of key regional organizations such as the African Union, the European Union and OSCE. The overarching policy is being cascaded through a hierarchy of thematic guidelines, manuals, standard operating procedures and training materials on specific sub-areas as identified within the four core functions. The guidance materials are being developed by the United Nations, in cooperation with the

African Union, the European Union and other key regional and professional organizations, and are intended for use by any organization or Member State deploying police to serve in complex, multidimensional international peace operations.

Security sector reform, and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

53. Since 2009, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the African Union Commission have enhanced their partnership on security sector reform, most recently in close collaboration with the European Union, the United Nations Office to the African Union, the United Nations Office for Project Services and the African Security Sector Network. The partnership has resulted in several key achievements, including the adoption of the first continental policy framework on security sector reform and the design and implementation of the $2.4 million support programme on security sector reform, which has facilitated the development of related operational guidance. The policy framework is now actively being disseminated to African Union member States and regional economic communities, including through training sessions and the production of guidance documents on, for example, how to incorporate the provisions of the policy into domestic legislation. With regard to doctrinal development in the area of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, the African Union, while subscribing to the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards, is developing complementary Africa-specific guidelines, with five already in place and an additional four planned for 2015.

Training

54. In the area of training, the United Nations continues to collaborate with the African Union in the assessment of the immediate training needs for its past and ongoing missions, especially in Mali and Somalia. The United Nations has been invited by the African Union to participate in the development and review of a peace operations training curriculum prepared by the African Union in partnership with the African Peace Support Trainers Association, as well as the planning and delivery of relevant training. Another area of significant cooperation relates to the rehatting of troops to United Nations-led peacekeeping operations. Receiving appropriate predeployment training on the protection of civilians, including women and children, is a predeployment requirement for United Nations missions. The Integrated Training Service of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support supported the training of AFISMA troops in connection with their rehatting under MINUSMA in July 2013. During July and August 2014, similar rehatting training was conducted for troops entering MINUSCA. In both cases, personnel were trained on the mission mandate and background; military and police concepts of operations; rules of engagement; the United Nations code of conduct for peacekeepers; the zero tolerance policy regarding sexual exploitation and abuse; human rights; international humanitarian law; the protection of civilians; conflict-related sexual violence; child protection; and support for humanitarian assistance. The United Nations will seek to strengthen its training support capacity for the African Union.

55. Overall, the potential for training cooperation between the United Nations and the African Union, NATO, the European Union and other organizations should continue to be explored in cases where organizations have training capabilities and capacity applicable to United Nations peacekeeping efforts and where the respective training architectures can be aligned. Examples of such cooperation might include the sharing of experience or expertise, the development of training methodology, standards and tools for training delivery, evaluation and certification, and the design and management of e-learning or simulations and other training exercises.

VII. Observations

56. The framers of the Charter of the United Nations showed great vision in foreseeing a global, collective security architecture with the United Nations at its centre and a clear role for regional arrangements. As shown in the present report, the partnership between the United Nations and regional organizations in respect of peacekeeping activity has never been stronger, particularly in Africa. It continues to deepen and evolve, with the United Nations, the African Union, the regional economic communities and the European Union working side by side, and increasingly hand in hand, in multiple countries and regions.

57. We have thus entered an era of "partnership peacekeeping", where close cooperation among multiple multilateral actors throughout every phase of a crisis is becoming the norm — and an essential component of each organization. Rather than one organization exiting and handing off its mandates/responsibilities to another, the respective roles of the organizations continuously evolve to meet new requirements and complement the changing roles being played by the others. This is a paradigm shift that is not the result of happenstance, but reflects the invaluable contribution that each organization can make, whether in the political, security, human rights, development or humanitarian sphere, during each period of the overall response. It also reflects the clear recognition that no single organization can effectively address increasingly complex, multifaceted peace and security challenges on its own, whether at the subregional, regional or global level. Responding to those challenges has increasingly been and must be a joint endeavour. At the same time, it is important that the endeavour truly be the full sum of all its parts, namely, that each organization play a mutually supportive role with the others to advance the common goal of peace.

58. In order to continue to make progress in that regard, there is a need to further strengthen the formal and informal mechanisms of engagement at the strategic level. It is my hope that the Security Council will consider adopting a clearer methodology for consultation with its counterparts at the regional and subregional levels, particularly with the Peace and Security Council of the African Union. This would allow for greater political coherence, especially in determining the role of each organization in response to crises. Although it is unrealistic to expect organizations to always agree on the best responses, strengthening the channels and practices of consultation would facilitate more rapid decision-making and an optimal use of resources, not least by reducing overlap and transaction costs. I trust that the other members of the Security Council will fully support the pivotal role that the African three can play in enhancing coherence between the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, including during the drafting of relevant resolutions.

59. There is a need for the United Nations and regional actors to cooperate as closely as possible on the planning of their respective operations as their roles adapt to each new phase of the overall response to a crisis. The present report shows the significant advances that have been made in this area as well, notably in the Central African Republic, Mali and Somalia. Planning together and early for transitions between different missions is particularly important. Important lessons have been learned from the recent transitions of operations from the African Union to the United Nations in the Central African Republic and Mali, which should be applied to future transitions. The transition from EUFOR RCA to MINUSCA was exemplary and reflected substantial improvement compared with other transitions of operations from the European Union to the United Nations. Moving forward, it is important to continue to capture lessons together and ensure that each organization incorporates them into its guidance.

60. In my recent letter to the President of the Security Council on lessons learned on the transitions from African Union peace operations to United Nations peacekeeping operations in the Central African Republic and Mali (S/2015/3), I offered a number of important recommendations that are relevant in the context of the present report. I reiterate my call for their full implementation, in particular the joint lessons learned exercise on the various mechanisms for the financing of African Union peace operations authorized by the Security Council. I intend to present the recommendations of those exercises in my report on ways to strengthen the partnership between the United Nations and the African Union, to be issued in 2016. I strongly believe that a shared understanding of the options for, and limitations to, the provision of support to African Union peace operations will not only strengthen the operational partnership between the United Nations and the African Union, but also inform the assumptions on which relevant decisions are made and contribute to the management of expectations.

61. Recent transitions have pointed to the need for the gradual harmonization of policies and standards between the United Nations and regional organizations and arrangements. Efforts in the future should be geared towards closing the gap between United Nations and African Union predeployment standards and training in key areas, in order to facilitate future rehatting processes. There is also a need to strengthen the understanding between the United Nations and its partners on what certain mandates mean in practice, first and foremost those related to the protection of civilians, which are central to contemporary peacekeeping. The work of all organizations in this area would benefit from more systematic coordination on guidance, training and the sharing of lessons learned.

62. The new paradigm of "partnership peacekeeping" also highlights the need to broaden the understanding of partnerships beyond the bilateral relationships forged between the United Nations and individual regional organizations, or between regional organizations. The most obvious example is the simultaneous engagement of the United Nations, the African Union and the European Union in Africa. In many contexts, as made evident in the present report, this has become a de facto trilateral partnership. We must explore how better to exploit the great potential that that trilateral partnership can offer.

63. In a similar vein, the response mechanisms and capabilities available to each organization should not be looked at in isolation from each other. Instead, we should see how they can be combined most effectively and used more predictably, in

particular in order to respond rapidly to acute crises, when thousands of lives are at risk. In that regard, I welcome the efforts of the African Union to fully operationalize ASF, a goal that will continue to be supported by the United Nations, as well as the continued discussions of the European Union on the operationalization of the European Union battlegroup. Given the magnitude of the peace and security challenges that the United Nations, the African Union and the European Union face together, it is imperative that they consider how those capacities can best complement each other to achieve the collective goal of mounting the most effective overall response to crises.

64. I also welcome the efforts and initiatives of other regional organizations and arrangements to strengthen their nascent peacekeeping capacities or develop new ones. The United Nations remains open to supporting such initiatives, in line with United Nations policies and standards, so that other regional organizations can eventually assume a greater role and further enrich today's peacekeeping partnership.

65. Finally, I would like to thank the African Union Commission and the European Union for their collaboration in preparing the present report, and all the regional organizations and arrangements partnering with the United Nations in the quest for peace.

United Nations S/2015/229*

Security Council

Distr.: General
1 April 2015

Original: English

Partnering for peace: moving towards partnership peacekeeping

Report of the Secretary-General

I. Introduction

1. In its resolution 2167 (2014), the Security Council requested that I prepare, in close consultation with the African Union Commission and the European Union, and no later than 31 March 2015, an assessment report and recommendations on the progress of the partnerships between the United Nations and relevant regional organizations in peacekeeping operations. Within the framework of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, the assessment and recommendations included in the present report build on and complement my previous reports on cooperation with regional organizations, including, more recently, my reports on United Nations-African Union cooperation in peace and security (S/2011/805) and on cooperation between the United Nations and regional and other organizations (S/2014/560) and my letter to the President of the Security Council on the transitions from the African Union peace operations to United Nations peacekeeping operations in Mali and the Central African Republic (S/2015/3). They are also guided by the positions and areas of interest of the Council as outlined in resolution 2167 (2014) and in its presidential statements on cooperation with the African Union (S/PRST/2014/27) and the European Union (S/PRST/2014/4).

2. The scope of the present report covers primarily the partnership with regional organizations and arrangements in peacekeeping, rather than the whole spectrum of peace and security actions. It is focused largely on the partnerships with the African Union and the European Union, the two organizations that are explicitly mentioned in paragraph 28 of resolution 2167 (2014) and are currently the closest partners of the United Nations in respect of peacekeeping efforts. Other regional and subregional organizations and arrangements are mentioned in relevant areas, where they have engaged on peacekeeping issues and in peacekeeping operations.

II. Trends related to peacekeeping partnerships

3. The demand for peacekeeping has grown over the past decade. The bulk of the peacekeeping efforts are undertaken in Africa, with over 87 per cent of United Nations peacekeepers deployed on the continent. At the same time, peacekeeping is

* Reissued for technical reasons on 21 April 2015.

15-05045* (E) 220415

Please recycle

facing a shifting conflict dynamic, characterized by increasing regionalization and globalization, as well as, at times, the presence of unconventional threats, in particular from extremist groups operating side by side with criminal groups and parties to the conflict. Recently, a majority of peacekeepers have been operating in places where there is little peace to keep and where robust action is often required to implement mandates on the protection of civilians.

4. In that context, the engagement of regional partners in peacekeeping alongside United Nations operations has become the norm rather than the exception. Nowhere is this fact more evident than in Africa, where the engagement of the African Union and subregional mechanisms, as well as the European Union, alongside United Nations operations, is present throughout all phases of the conflict. At the moment, there are nine United Nations peacekeeping operations on the continent, six peace support operations led by the African Union and regional economic communities/ regional mechanisms, one hybrid United Nations-African Union operation, and nine European Union civilian missions and military operations. The models of such multilateral engagement are each time adapted to fit the specific circumstances of the crisis in question.

5. Over the years, those models have shaped a shared understanding of the comparative advantages of each organization and a desired division of labour among them. In the recent cases of Mali and the Central African Republic, the African Union took over the operations initiated by subregional actors, to be later rehatted as United Nations operations. In both cases, the United Nations and the European Union were engaged in supporting the deployment of the African Union-led operations. In Mali, following the transfer of authority from the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), the African Union has retained a political role with the establishment of the African Union Mission for Mali and the Sahel (MISAHEL), which has continued supporting the inter-Malian inclusive dialogue. In the Central African Republic, following the transfer of authority from the African-led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic (MISCA) to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), the African Union, through MISAC, and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) have continued to play a key role in the ongoing transition and stabilization of the country. Also in both cases, the European Union has deployed its own, smaller and well-targeted common security and defence policy presences, alongside African Union or United Nations-led operations, with either a training and advisory mandate or a mandate that serves to bridge the gap between missions.

6. Those patterns, as well as other successful cases of cooperation, such as in Somalia, may provide a framework for a further rationalization of efforts in future cases. For example, the numerous cases of simultaneous United Nations, African Union and European Union engagements on the continent demonstrate that all three organizations can contribute necessary peacekeeping capacities and solutions to crises and post-conflict situations. In many cases, all three also play important roles in support of the political and mediation processes, along with other actors. Nevertheless, the potential for closer trilateral engagement and cooperation among the United Nations, the African Union and the European Union has yet to be fully explored and exploited.

7. There is little question that United Nations partnerships with regional actors in peacekeeping have reached a considerable level of maturity and complexity in recent years. The proliferation of actors and models of engagement has presented both a challenge, in respect of avoiding a fragmentation of efforts, duplication or competition, and an opportunity, in respect of mobilizing as efficiently as possible the collective leverage and comparative advantages of different organizations in attaining shared peace and security objectives. The sections below provide a review of the institutional mechanisms and initiatives in place, which are aimed at maximizing that opportunity, as well as a review of the ways in which the mechanisms have worked in practice in various countries and thematic areas.

III. Coordination and consultation mechanisms

Strategic-level mechanisms

8. Effective and efficient partnerships in peacekeeping depend on the alignment of strategic and political objectives between different peacekeeping actors, from the early planning and pre-mandate stages of their operations to their transition or exit. This in turn is dependent on effective cooperation between their decision-making organs. In some challenging cases, it may be difficult to achieve a clear strategic direction within one organization, let alone among a number of organizations with different memberships and perspectives, and whose relationships are only loosely defined, in the overall context of the primary responsibility of the Security Council for peace and security.

The United Nations and the African Union

9. The entry into force of the Protocol relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union in December 2003 substantially strengthened the powers of the African Union in matters of conflict prevention and resolution. Since then, the African Union and the regional economic communities/regional mechanisms have been increasingly taking initiatives on peace and security, and their role in those areas has grown, both qualitatively and quantitatively. As a result, the partnership between the United Nations and the African Union has evolved from a capacity-building model to a partnership based on strategic convergence.

10. Article 17 of the Protocol relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union recognizes the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of peace and security. In practice, since 2007 the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union have established closer links, including through the holding of annual joint consultative meetings. Both organs have underlined their commitment to the development of a stronger and more structured relationship, through enhanced information-sharing, synergies in planning and monitoring, joint assessments and strategies to increase the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations. The practical implementation of those commitments, however, has materialized slowly.

11. The consultative meetings have yet to lead to more aligned political decisions on specific issues between the two organizations, whose processes for decision-making differ significantly. The challenge of reaching institutional synchronization and a clear understanding on the level of consultation required between the two

bodies has sometimes led to incoherent political responses. That challenge has been compounded by the lack of a clear division of labour between the regional economic communities/regional mechanisms and the African Union with regard to peace and security issues in Africa. In my recent letter to the President of the Security Council on the lessons learned exercise on transitions (S/2015/3), I underscored the importance of political coherence and the harmonization of policy and strategies at the highest levels.

12. In the Central African Republic, the strategic convergence among the partners involved was facilitated to a large extent by the common vision that was provided by the Security Council at an early stage and in several resolutions, in which the Secretariat was requested to undertake, in consultation with the African Union and other regional partners, contingency planning for the transformation of the African Union peace operation into a United Nations peacekeeping mission. By contrast, in Mali, divisions among Member States and the relevant organs at the international, regional and subregional levels, and within the Secretariat, on the appropriate way forward weakened the ability of the peacekeeping partners to jointly establish a clear and commonly acceptable road map for the resolution of the crisis.

13. A harmonized strategic approach, including a shared strategic vision of the objectives for the deployment of a peacekeeping mission from the outset, is also critical in the case of a hybrid mission such as the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). Whereas views regarding the desirability of the hybrid models may differ, it is clear that they should be anchored in close formal and informal consultations between the United Nations and the African Union at the inception and throughout the life of such missions. When the strategic objectives and visions of the two organizations on the resolution of the conflict or on the required engagement with the parties start to differ, a hybrid mission such as UNAMID loses its political leverage on the parties and its ability to implement its mandate.

14. The lessons learned exercise on the transitions in the Central African Republic and in Mali has demonstrated that the African elected members of the Security Council (the African three) can play a pivotal role in enhancing coordination and synergy between the two Councils. In February 2014, the Peace and Security Council of the African Union formally endorsed the establishment of that mechanism in New York and the Permanent Observer Mission of the African Union to the United Nations as the secretariat of the mechanism. The mechanism can help to ensure that the voices of the African Union and of relevant regional economic communities are heard in the debates and decisions of the Security Council and therefore support the creation of a unified vision among the Security Council, the Peace and Security Council of the African Union and relevant regional economic communities.

15. The United Nations Secretariat and the African Union Commission have deepened their partnership. The United Nations-African Union Joint Task Force on Peace and Security has proved to be an important instrument in fostering greater coherence, allowing the Secretariat and the Commission to coordinate immediate and long-term strategic issues of common interest and identify areas for concerted action.

16. The establishment of the United Nations Office to the African Union (UNOAU) in 2010 has also been instrumental in advancing the peacekeeping partnership between the two organizations. It has been carrying out a dual role of working with the African Union in supporting the planning and management of current operations and the development of policies, while supporting the development of institutional

capacities in the service of the partnership, with a particular focus on the operationalization of the African Peace and Security Architecture.

17. At the political level, close and consistent consultation mechanisms between the United Nations and regional actors are also essential in achieving greater strategic and political convergence, including in support of peacekeeping mandates. The Support and Follow-up Group on the Situation in Mali, co-chaired by the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the United Nations, and comprising the European Union and the International Contact Group on the Central African Republic, co-chaired by the African Union and the Congo, have been effective in ensuring coordination among stakeholders in support of the peace process in those countries. They have also helped to create an enabling environment for the implementation of the mandates of MINUSMA and MINUSCA.

18. Other political and mediation arrangements being carried out in conjunction with United Nations peacekeeping activities include the African Union High-level Implementation Panel, which leads the engagement and mediation efforts on the Sudan and between the Sudan and South Sudan, and is supported by the United Nations Special Envoy for the Sudan and South Sudan and the African Union-United Nations Joint Special Representative for Darfur. The teams jointly strategize, undertake joint missions and, when necessary, jointly address the Peace and Security Council of the African Union and the Security Council of the United Nations. Similarly, in South Sudan, my Special Envoy for the Sudan and South Sudan and my Special Representative for South Sudan work in close consultation with the Intergovernmental Authority on Development in the mediation process and engage the African Union Commission senior leadership and Member States in support of the Authority on a regular basis.

The United Nations and the European Union

19. Strategic-level communication and coordination between the United Nations and the European Union on peacekeeping and crisis management is carried out in various formats. The Security Council holds biannual informal meetings with the Political and Security Committee of the European Union, at which peacekeeping and other peace and security issues are discussed. These serve as important forums for the exchange of information, but usually fall short of establishing a convergence of views on appropriate action in particular peacekeeping contexts. With regard to mandates, when the Common Security and Defence Policy operations of the European Union deploy in United Nations peacekeeping contexts, coordination usually takes place through members of the Security Council. The members help to ensure that such missions are referred to in Security Council resolutions and are complementary to the broader mandates of peacekeeping operations, whether led by the United Nations or by the African Union.

20. A number of other high-level United Nations-European Union strategic discussions are held, which involve the Secretariat and complement efforts in this regard, including the regular briefings by the High Representative of the Union of Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to the Security Council and briefings by senior United Nations officials to the Political and Security Committee in Brussels and the biannual United Nations-European Union Steering Committee on Crisis Management, co-chaired by the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping and the Deputy Secretary-General of the European External Action Service. The latter allows for

more detailed discussions on peacekeeping issues while providing opportunities for strategic alignment on such issues as the division of labour, political messaging and exit strategies. Strategic-level communication is further facilitated by the European Union delegation to the United Nations in New York and the establishment, in 2011, of the United Nations Liaison Office for Peace and Security in Brussels.

21. Three important documents have also continued to provide a cross-cutting strategic framework for the relationship with the European Union in peacekeeping and crisis management: the 2003 Joint Declaration on United Nations-European Union Cooperation in Crisis Management; the 2007 joint statement on United Nations-European Union Cooperation in Crisis Management; and the plan of action to enhance European Union Common Security and Defence Policy support to United Nations peacekeeping (European Union plan of action), adopted by the Political and Security Committee of the European Union in 2012. The latter identified the priorities for United Nations-European Union cooperation in peacekeeping that had been pursued jointly by the two organizations over the past two years, including seeking enhanced uniformed contributions by European Union member States; coordination during planning; cooperation in respect of policy and guidance; and lessons learned and training. Discussions are under way on the adoption of a follow-up framework on cooperation, based on the previous framework, but renewing the commitment and re-establishing related priorities, in line with more recent experiences.

The United Nations and other regional organizations and arrangements

22. Besides the African Union, subregional organizations in Africa and the European Union, there have been few cases in recent years in which strategic coordination has taken place in the context of the deployment of a peacekeeping operation. A notable example is the Syrian Arab Republic, where, following the escalation of the crisis, the United Nations cooperated with the League of Arab States (LAS), primarily at the political and mediation levels, leading up to the deployment of the United Nations Supervision Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic (UNSMIS). In particular, in February 2012 agreement was reached on a joint diplomatic effort between LAS and the United Nations, with the appointment of the first Joint United Nations-League of Arab States Special Envoy to Syria. The efforts of the Joint Special Envoy led to the adoption by the Security Council of resolution 2042 (2012), which sets out the six-point plan. The plan provided the basis for the deployment of UNSMIS, with the aim of observing and reporting on the cessation of the violence. With conflict escalating across the country, however, the UNSMIS mandate ended in July 2012, following the fate of an earlier mission comprising 67 LAS monitors.

Operational-level mechanisms

23. Beyond strategic-level discussions, operational coordination is crucial to building the common understanding that contributes to strategic-level decision-making and to ensuring the effective and coherent implementation of mandates on the ground. It involves a number of actors on all sides, including the teams producing and harmonizing analysis, and planning or backstopping the operations once deployed; and the mechanisms through which coherence is achieved not only

between the missions operating in parallel or engaged in rehatting, but also with other entities on the ground.

The United Nations and the African Union

24. To date, the United Nations and the African Union have worked together at the operational level on the ground in five peacekeeping contexts, namely, Burundi, the Central African Republic, Mali, Somalia and Darfur, the Sudan. Cooperation in those countries/areas has largely shaped the peacekeeping partnership between the two organizations at the operational level. Within that partnership, the model most used has been that of sequential deployment, transitioning from an African Union-led operation to a United Nations operation. In such cases, operational cooperation takes place through the provision of support to the African Union during the planning phases of its operations, as well as during their deployment, and later on through close cooperation to ensure an efficient transition to and rehatting as a United Nations operation.

25. Somalia represents a successful example of joint planning, especially in view of the Security Council position on the potential transition from the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to a United Nations peacekeeping operation at the appropriate time. Collaboration in the field on the 2012 strategic concept for AMISOM succeeded in revitalizing the African Union-United Nations strategic partnership and led to an increase in the AMISOM troop level endorsed by the Peace and Security Council of the African Union and the Security Council of the United Nations. The 2013 joint African Union-United Nations assessment mission reinforced that collaboration through the establishment of shared strategic objectives and benchmarks. The outcome of the mission was the development of three options for the way forward, one of which was endorsed by both Councils. The broad consultations and inclusion of key partners paved the way for agreement and swift implementation of the joint recommendations. A second joint African Union-United Nations review of AMISOM and the Somalia National Security Forces is scheduled to take place in April 2015.

26. Two recent examples of sequential African Union-United Nations deployments are AFISMA in 2012, followed by MINUSMA in 2013; and MISCA in 2013, followed by MINUSCA in 2014. In the latter case, the United Nations worked from the outset to support the transition of authority from the ECCAS-led Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in the Central African Republic (MICOPAX) to MISCA, and participated in the African Union-led assessment missions, as early as in April 2013. The United Nations provided technical and expert advice on the planning and deployment of MISCA, the strengthening of MISCA command and control and the building of its administrative infrastructure and training capacity. Following the adoption of resolution 2149 (2014), the United Nations and the African Union developed a transition plan, operationalized by a team in coordination with MISCA and the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA), thus contributing to a smoother transition. For example, the establishment of a joint MISCA-MINUSCA coordination forum on the protection of civilians in Bangui as part of transition planning efforts helped to avoid a vacuum in the implementation of the protection of civilians mandate.

27. Close operational cooperation should also be a key element in the force and police generation processes in the case of sequential deployments. In respect of both

the Central African Republic and Mali, although clarity on United Nations requirements for rehatting was established at an early stage, following the decisions for the transition, the capabilities of the AFISMA and MISCA troops inherited by the successor United Nations missions — in terms of equipment and self-sustainment, as well as in terms of training — did not match relevant United Nations standards. While lower standards are sometimes inherent in the rapid deployment of enforcement operations in Africa, rehatting can be more successful through United Nations-African Union collaboration in respect of facilitating the fulfilment of United Nations standards during the transition of uniformed personnel to African Union missions that are expected to be rehatted.

28. The United Nations also continues to coordinate with the African Union in providing support to enhance the African Union Regional Task Force, a component of the Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord's Resistance Army. At the request of the African Union Commission, the United Nations sent a multidisciplinary team of experts to Yaoundé in February 2015 to support the development of the strategic concept of operations towards the operationalization of the multinational joint task force initiative against Boko Haram. The Force Intervention Brigade in the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) represents another creative model of operational collaboration between the two organizations, with the United Nations following up on what began as a regional initiative to resolve the crisis in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and established the Force Intervention Brigade within MONUSCO in 2013.

The United Nations and the European Union

29. Operational cooperation with the European Union in different peacekeeping settings, including, most recently, the Central African Republic, as well as the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Mali, has usually been based on a clear division of labour, aimed at ensuring the most efficient use of the capacities and resources of each organization. In the start-up planning phases, in which coordination is crucial to ensuring complementarity and avoiding duplication, or seamless transitions logistically and operationally, recent examples have demonstrated the progress made in the United Nations partnership with the European Union over the past few years. Starting in Mali and later in the Central African Republic, operational planning for MINUSMA, the European Union military mission to contribute to the training of the Malian Armed Forces (EUTM) and the European Union Common Security and Defence Policy mission in Mali (EUCAP Sahel Mali) took place in a consultative manner with the European Union. The United Nations-European Union guidelines for coordination during the planning for respective operations, envisaged in the European Union plan of action, were tested in Mali for EUCAP Sahel Mali as well as to facilitate a successful transfer of security tasks from the European Union military operation in the Central African Republic (EUFOR RCA) to MINUSCA and the deployment of the European Union Military Advisory Mission in the Central African Republic earlier in March in the Central African Republic. Further to those guidelines, the United Nations and the European Union plan to look jointly at the lessons learned in the transition and handover from the European Union operation to the United Nations in the Central African Republic and develop, as necessary, joint guidelines for similar transitions in the future. The experience of the handover of the European Union Ucatex camp to

MINUSCA should also be positively acknowledged, and lessons from that exercise should be drawn for potential future cases in which the sharing of resources between the two organizations are needed.

30. Cooperation and coordination on the ground between United Nations and European Union missions and operations deployed in parallel have been efficient and regular in most country scenarios. Coordination mechanisms that have worked in different country settings include the establishment of liaison officers on the ground, co-location, arrangements for the exchange of classified information, and the participation of European Union representatives in coordinating structures led by the United Nations, in particular rule of law and security sector reform-related mechanisms that involve European Union civilian missions. In order to be effective, such mechanisms should always be backed by strong political will to engage in sharing and partnerships. In Kosovo,[1] United Nations-European Union cooperation should be further strengthened to ensure a more coordinated international engagement as the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) undergoes further restructuring.

31. Finally, in the light of the European Union delegation's prominent role in providing support for the justice sector and other institutions in post-crisis countries, close cooperation with the wider United Nations family in jointly setting related priorities has been crucial to the implementation of coherent institution-building strategies. For example, a close partnership has been developed between MINUSMA and the European Union delegation in Mali, which provided equipment and supported the refurbishment of a court in Timbuktu. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, seven prosecution support cells have been established by MONUSCO with European Union funding to assist national authorities in the prosecution of serious crimes.

32. With regard to exit strategies, there has been less of a culture of coordination between the two organizations, although both are committed to improving their engagement during the end phases of their respective missions. Unless there is a clear understanding of a transition from one organization to the other, the two organizations have been more inclined to conduct their own strategic reviews and decide on their drawdown and follow-on arrangements on the basis of limited consultation with their partners. For example, in the case of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the two organizations could have consulted more closely and at earlier stages in planning their respective reviews and transitions, although the level of engagement improved at the later stages of the process.

The United Nations and other regional partners

33. Kosovo, in accordance with resolution 1244 (1999), represents an important example of United Nations operational coordination with other regional actors, in particular the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The OSCE Mission in Kosovo has enjoyed a long-standing relationship with the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) as its institution-building pillar, an arrangement that has allowed for close and constructive operational engagement throughout the years.

[1] References to Kosovo shall be understood to be in the context of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999).

The NATO International Security Force in Kosovo (KFOR), deployed as the international security presence alongside UNMIK, maintains some 5,000 troops on the ground and performs the role of the third emergency responder, after the Kosovo Police and EULEX. UNMIK and KFOR have enjoyed close cooperation, at the military liaison and head-of-mission levels, in the implementation of their respective mandates and on all operational issues, including in ensuring a stable environment in northern Kosovo and the protection of religious heritage sites.

IV. Capabilities and capacity-building support

34. The delivery of peacekeeping in partnership with regional actors should benefit from stronger partnership with regard to capability development. While major actors in the field of peacekeeping have been working separately on the development of their own capabilities, some synergies have been established on a bilateral basis. These are focused on the sharing of expertise between organizations, and the United Nations has been both a recipient and a provider of such expertise and assistance. A common priority has been and should continue to be to ensure that the capabilities developed can be used to facilitate the rapid response of the international community to unfolding crises.

The United Nations and the African Union

35. As the African Union takes up more responsibilities in peace operations, it has been faced with the challenges of acquiring the requisite capacity to plan, deploy and sustain such operations. While the African Union has been willing to deploy rapidly and even engage in combat operations despite the risk of casualties, it has not always been able to provide troops and police with the required training and capabilities in line with United Nations standards.

36. The African Union has been working towards establishing and operationalizing the African Standby Force (ASF) and, more recently, has begun developing the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises. The United Nations, through the United Nations Office to the African Union, is working closely with the African Union and the regional economic communities/regional mechanisms to support those efforts, accelerate the operationalization of ASF and the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises and improve the conceptualization, planning and management of African-led peace operations. Specifically, the Office has continued to support the African Union in the development and review of key policy and guiding documents, such as the doctrine issued by the African Union Peace Support Operations Division. The United Nations also continues to assist the African Union in the development of the police and rule of law elements of ASF as well as in the implementation of the ASF road map III, including the AMANI Africa II training cycle activities.

37. Many of the long-standing challenges related to the capacity of the African Union to deploy and manage peace support operations in extremely difficult conditions and at short notice have yet to be overcome. However, both ASF and the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises have the potential to become effective rapid-response tools for the African Union and, by extension, for the United Nations. Once fully operational, those forces could provide a critical start-up capacity for responding to African crises as bridging mechanisms, as well as for

providing enforcement action, if required. Alternatively, they could complement a United Nations peacekeeping operation when in extremis support is needed.

38. Beyond supporting the operationalization of ASF and the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises, the United Nations is engaged in building the capacities of the African Union and its member States in a number of key thematic areas related to peacekeeping. In particular, the United Nations Mine Action Service has supported the African Union in preparing a mine action and explosive remnants of war strategic framework for 2014-2017, aimed at enhancing the capacities of African Union member States and operations to deal with explosive threats. The United Nations and other partners, such as the World Bank, have also provided significant support to enhance the capacities of the African Union in the areas of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, security sector reform, human rights and child protection, including through secondment arrangements, institution-building programmes and the provision of technical assistance to civilian capacities in the African Union operations.

The United Nations and the European Union

39. Discussions with the European Union on capability development have been held in the context of United Nations efforts to expand its base of troop-contributing/police-contributing countries with additional European contributions, and in line with the relevant provisions of the European Union plan of action. States members of the European Union have indicated that contributions to United Nations peacekeeping should be discussed and determined on a bilateral basis, rather than through European Union-coordinated mechanisms. At the same time, the potential to "bundle" various European Union member State contributions into one package, potentially also combined with contributions from non-European Union members, in order to fill specific gaps in United Nations peacekeeping missions should not be underestimated. The European External Action Service has shown willingness to explore this issue further and to share capabilities with the Secretariat in respect of its expertise in specific areas, such as intelligence and rapid response.

40. With regard to rapid response, and the goal of the United Nations to deploy its operations more rapidly, the two organizations have been sharing experiences and information on their respective doctrine development. Discussions have been taking place on the possibility of deploying a European Union "battlegroup" as an autonomous rapid response force in support of or as a bridge to United Nations operations, including in specific country contexts. The battlegroup has yet to be deployed despite the potential offered by such a standing and rapidly deployable capacity. Discussions are expected to continue as European Union member States reinforce their efforts to ensure that this valuable tool is used, and I encourage this process.

41. The European Union has also been committed to building the African capacity for peacekeeping and crisis prevention. Beyond the financial support provided to African Union operations, the funds in the European Union African Peace Facility have been used for capacity-building actions focused on the operationalization of the African Peace and Security Architecture. The 2014-2016 action programme of the African Peace Facility realigned the support provided by the Facility to the African Peace and Security Architecture in order to ensure more targeted support, including effective assistance to the upcoming AMANI Africa II training cycle

activities, and support for activities dealing with strategic lift, communications and logistics. In addition, the European Union is preparing to launch a new "train and equip initiative" that will complement its training activities on the continent. In the light of the commitment of both the European Union and the United Nations to support African capacity, that is an area where increased triangular cooperation could be pursued.

The United Nations and other regional organizations and arrangements

42. NATO capabilities and expertise in dealing with asymmetric threats, in particular in Afghanistan, have resulted in new fields of United Nations-NATO cooperation. The United Nations can benefit from NATO expertise in specific areas and from its large network of training centres and centres of excellence, which could be used to support the United Nations in those areas. In particular, cooperation has been ongoing in respect of counter-improvised explosive device issues, including through an awareness-raising course for United Nations staff conducted by the centre of excellence in Madrid. Cooperation in 2015 will be focused on engagement with the centres of excellence on counter-improvised explosive device issues, military engineering and explosive ordnance disposal, on participation in joint exercises and on the conduct of a seminar on strategic and operational theory and practice regarding counter-improvised explosive device efforts.

43. The United Nations is willing to contribute to the efforts of other regional organizations to build up regional peacekeeping capacities. A concrete example of such cooperation is with the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which has been supported by the United Nations in the development of expertise and capabilities in peacekeeping over the past two years. Following a memorandum of understanding concluded between the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the CSTO secretariat on 28 September 2012, on strengthening cooperation between the two organizations, the United Nations organized briefings and shared material on United Nations peacekeeping policies and standards with CSTO officials engaged in the development of its 4,000-strong standby force. Most recently, Malaysia's announcement of the potential plans of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to establish a regional peacekeeping force could pave the way for increased cooperation with the Department, which is interested in supporting the endeavour.

V. Financing for peacekeeping

44. While regional organizations have the responsibility to secure their own resources, the need to enhance the predictability, sustainability and flexibility of financing for operations launched by a regional organization operating under a United Nations mandate remains a critical issue, particularly in cases of transition to a United Nations operation. In particular, the continued absence of predictable and sustainable funding has led to a number of limitations for the peace operations deployed by the African Union, which in turn have an impact on the overall ability of the international community to effectively respond to crises in Africa. The Peace Fund established by the African Union to support its peace support operations is inadequate to support the current demands of African Union peacekeeping. There are efforts under way to increase the allocation of African Union-assessed funding to its peace and security efforts; the January 2015 African Union Summit decided to allocate 25 per cent of the assessed contributions of African Union member States to

peace operations. In the meantime, the African Union has been largely dependent on donor funding or, as in the case of Somalia, on United Nations-assessed contributions to launch and sustain its operations.

45. The largest source of external funding is the European Union African Peace Facility. Established in 2004, the Facility is the key instrument for facilitating the implementation of joint African Union-European Union priorities on peace and security, with a funding envelope of 750 million euros for the period 2014-2017, the vast majority of which is dedicated to supporting African-led peace operations. This financial support for African Union-led missions has been a predictable source of funding that has proved crucial to the African Union in planning and carrying out its operations. China and the United States of America are developing similar funding mechanisms to support the African Union, in addition to a range of smaller bilateral arrangements. African Union peace operations are also supported by direct bilateral support provided to their troop-contributing/police-contributing countries, which is particularly valuable in assisting the latter with improving their lethal equipment capabilities.

46. The United Nations has also developed various models to support African Union operations, including a mix of assessed funding and voluntary contributions, or voluntary contributions prior to transfer of authority to a United Nations peacekeeping operation. The largest and most developed funding model today is in Somalia, where the United Nations Support Office for the African Union Mission in Somalia (UNSOA) manages the disbursement of funds from the United Nations-assessed budget to provide logistical support to AMISOM. That model is complemented by a United Nations-managed trust fund, in accordance with resolution 1863 (2009). That logistical support package of assessed funding has been in place since 2009, with the provision of services and equipment necessitating the utilization of voluntary contributions to meet shortfalls. Following the adoption of resolution 2036 (2012), the shortfalls were also covered by assessed funding, leading to a significant decline in trust fund activity. The Security Council adopted resolution 2124 (2013), by which it created an additional trust fund for the provision of United Nations non-lethal logistical support to AMISOM and approximately 11,000 Somali National Army troops participating in joint operations, including for medical evacuation. That support has been complemented by substantial financial assistance from the European Union in respect of paying AMISOM troop, police and civilian allowances and salaries directly through the Facility. As such, the Somalia experience represents a successful model of United Nations-African Union-European Union collaboration in this area.

47. Although the United Nations trust fund model to support African Union peace operations was also utilized in the Central African Republic and Mali, it encountered numerous challenges. Discussions to improve its use are under way, specifically in identifying ways to improve allocation and disbursement to the troop-contributing countries based on their priorities. The United Nations Trust Fund for Support to the African-led International Support Mission in Mali was established pursuant to resolution 2085 (2012). Contributions amounting to approximately $44 million were received, of which approximately $38 million in contributions were not earmarked, with the original intention to provide a mission support package and equipment to the various uniformed AFISMA components. Equipment worth approximately $12 million was deployed to Mali from the United Nations strategic deployment stocks. With the transfer of authority, options for providing support became limited given the United

Nations obligation to support troop-contributing/police-contributing countries through assessed funding. On that basis, donors determined their preferences for the utilization of remaining balances, with the majority in support of counter-improvised explosive device efforts. Similarly, the United Nations Trust Fund in Support of the African-led International Mission in the Central African Republic was established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013). Contributions amounting to approximately $5 million have been received, to be used to provide strategic communications to MISCA prior to the transfer of authority, and catering and kitchen equipment to the current troop-contributing countries of MINUSCA.

48. As I highlighted in my recent letter to the President of the Council (S/2015/3), the experiences in the Central African Republic and Mali have confirmed that no funding or support modality is sufficient on its own. It thus appears that there is a need to mobilize a broad range of modalities in most cases, including a combination of voluntary, assessed and bilateral modalities, as appropriate. In that regard, I have called for a lessons learned exercise, to be jointly undertaken with the African Union, which will be aimed at reviewing and providing an assessment of the various mechanisms available to improve the predictability, sustainability and flexibility of financing for African Union peace operations authorized by the Security Council.

VI. Cooperation in policy development and training

49. Beyond capability development and rapid deployment, the United Nations has also increased its cooperation with regional organizations in respect of policy development in a number of key thematic areas. This has yet to lead to full harmonization of predeployment training standards, which is crucial to ensuring quick and effective rehatting processes, in cases of transition from one organization to another. It should be noted that cooperation in policy development does not necessarily translate into similar results and levels of implementation, as the latter also depends on the institutional culture, mechanisms and capacities of each organization.

Protection of civilians

50. In recent years, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations has worked with regional organizations on the development of guidance and conceptual frameworks for the protection of civilians. The Department was closely involved in the recent development of guidance on the issue for European Union military operations, for example. The African Union and the Department also engaged in close consultations regarding the development of guidance on the protection of civilians in the African Union context, but the guidance was never finalized. While consultations between the Department and the African Union endeavoured to ensure consistency between the concepts of the United Nations and the African Union in respect of the protection of civilians, it has become clear that one concept may not be sufficient, given that African Union and United Nations operations are often deployed in different operating environments. In Somalia, for example, AMISOM must focus on avoiding civilian casualties in the context of offensive operations, rather than proactively mitigating threats to vulnerable civilian populations. At the same time, African Union missions sometimes receive protection of civilians mandates that are similar to those of United Nations peacekeeping operations, as in the case of the Central African Republic. In

such situations, a consistent approach on the protection of civilians greatly enhances the collective efforts and makes transitioning from one organization to the other easier for troops, police and civilian personnel. Given the likelihood of the deployment of African Union and United Nations operations, often sequentially, into situations in which civilian lives are at risk, greater work on formulating and, where possible, aligning the concepts would be a step in the right direction.

Women and peace and security

51. The United Nations Office to the African Union works with the African Union Commission on issues related to gender mainstreaming and women and peace and security, including in the development of policies and guidelines and in the conceptualization and planning of African Union-led operations. Collaboration on the agenda regarding women and peace and security is also well established with NATO. The two organizations have prioritized the development of common messaging and terminology on gender and conflict-related sexual violence in order to promote a harmonized approach to operationalizing the principles regarding women and peace and security in respective operations.

Police

52. The Policy on United Nations Police in Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions, promulgated by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support, defines the core functions of United Nations police and the fundamental principles guiding its activities. It was developed with the assistance of key regional organizations such as the African Union, the European Union and OSCE. The overarching policy is being cascaded through a hierarchy of thematic guidelines, manuals, standard operating procedures and training materials on specific sub-areas as identified within the four core functions. The guidance materials are being developed by the United Nations, in cooperation with the African Union, the European Union and other key regional and professional organizations, and are intended for use by any organization or Member State deploying police to serve in complex, multidimensional international peace operations.

Security sector reform, and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

53. Since 2009, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the African Union Commission have enhanced their partnership on security sector reform, most recently in close collaboration with the European Union, the United Nations Office to the African Union, the United Nations Office for Project Services and the African Security Sector Network. The partnership has resulted in several key achievements, including the adoption of the first continental policy framework on security sector reform and the design and implementation of the $2.4 million support programme on security sector reform, which has facilitated the development of related operational guidance. The policy framework is now actively being disseminated to African Union member States and regional economic communities, including through training sessions and the production of guidance documents on, for example, how to

incorporate the provisions of the policy into domestic legislation. With regard to doctrinal development in the area of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, the African Union, while subscribing to the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards, is developing complementary Africa-specific guidelines, with five already in place and an additional four planned for 2015.

Training

54. In the area of training, the United Nations continues to collaborate with the African Union in the assessment of the immediate training needs for its past and ongoing missions, especially in Mali and Somalia. The United Nations has been invited by the African Union to participate in the development and review of a peace operations training curriculum prepared by the African Union in partnership with the African Peace Support Trainers Association, as well as the planning and delivery of relevant training. Another area of significant cooperation relates to the rehatting of troops to United Nations-led peacekeeping operations. Receiving appropriate predeployment training on the protection of civilians, including women and children, is a predeployment requirement for United Nations missions. The Integrated Training Service of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support supported the training of AFISMA troops in connection with their rehatting under MINUSMA in July 2013. During July and August 2014, similar rehatting training was conducted for troops entering MINUSCA. In both cases, personnel were trained on the mission mandate and background; military and police concepts of operations; rules of engagement; the United Nations code of conduct for peacekeepers; the zero tolerance policy regarding sexual exploitation and abuse; human rights; international humanitarian law; the protection of civilians; conflict-related sexual violence; child protection; and support for humanitarian assistance. The United Nations will seek to strengthen its training support capacity for the African Union.

55. Overall, the potential for training cooperation between the United Nations and the African Union, NATO, the European Union and other organizations should continue to be explored in cases where organizations have training capabilities and capacity applicable to United Nations peacekeeping efforts and where the respective training architectures can be aligned. Examples of such cooperation might include the sharing of experience or expertise, the development of training methodology, standards and tools for training delivery, evaluation and certification, and the design and management of e-learning or simulations and other training exercises.

VII. Observations

56. The framers of the Charter of the United Nations showed great vision in foreseeing a global, collective security architecture with the United Nations at its centre and a clear role for regional arrangements. As shown in the present report, the partnership between the United Nations and regional organizations in respect of peacekeeping activity has never been stronger, particularly in Africa. It continues to deepen and evolve, with the United Nations, the African Union, the regional economic communities and the European Union working side by side, and increasingly hand in hand, in multiple countries and regions.

57. We have thus entered an era of "partnership peacekeeping", where close cooperation among multiple multilateral actors throughout every phase of a crisis is becoming the norm — and an essential component of each organization. Rather than one organization exiting and handing off its mandates/responsibilities to another, the respective roles of the organizations continuously evolve to meet new requirements and complement the changing roles being played by the others. This is a paradigm shift that is not the result of happenstance, but reflects the invaluable contribution that each organization can make, whether in the political, security, human rights, development or humanitarian sphere, during each period of the overall response. It also reflects the clear recognition that no single organization can effectively address increasingly complex, multifaceted peace and security challenges on its own, whether at the subregional, regional or global level. Responding to those challenges has increasingly been and must be a joint endeavour. At the same time, it is important that the endeavour truly be the full sum of all its parts, namely, that each organization play a mutually supportive role with the others to advance the common goal of peace.

58. In order to continue to make progress in that regard, there is a need to further strengthen the formal and informal mechanisms of engagement at the strategic level. It is my hope that the Security Council will consider adopting a clearer methodology for consultation with its counterparts at the regional and subregional levels, particularly with the Peace and Security Council of the African Union. This would allow for greater political coherence, especially in determining the role of each organization in response to crises. Although it is unrealistic to expect organizations to always agree on the best responses, strengthening the channels and practices of consultation would facilitate more rapid decision-making and an optimal use of resources, not least by reducing overlap and transaction costs. I trust that the other members of the Security Council will fully support the pivotal role that the African three can play in enhancing coherence between the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, including during the drafting of relevant resolutions.

59. There is a need for the United Nations and regional actors to cooperate as closely as possible on the planning of their respective operations as their roles adapt to each new phase of the overall response to a crisis. The present report shows the significant advances that have been made in this area as well, notably in the Central African Republic, Mali and Somalia. Planning together and early for transitions between different missions is particularly important. Important lessons have been learned from the recent transitions of operations from the African Union to the United Nations in the Central African Republic and Mali, which should be applied to future transitions. The transition from EUFOR RCA to MINUSCA was exemplary and reflected substantial improvement compared with other transitions of operations from the European Union to the United Nations. Moving forward, it is important to continue to capture lessons together and ensure that each organization incorporates them into its guidance.

60. In my recent letter to the President of the Security Council on lessons learned on the transitions from African Union peace operations to United Nations peacekeeping operations in the Central African Republic and Mali (S/2015/3), I offered a number of important recommendations that are relevant in the context of the present report. I reiterate my call for their full implementation, in particular the joint lessons learned exercise on the various mechanisms for the financing of African Union peace operations authorized by the Security Council. I intend to

present the recommendations of those exercises in my report on ways to strengthen the partnership between the United Nations and the African Union, to be issued in 2016. I strongly believe that a shared understanding of the options for, and limitations to, the provision of support to African Union peace operations will not only strengthen the operational partnership between the United Nations and the African Union, but also inform the assumptions on which relevant decisions are made and contribute to the management of expectations.

61. Recent transitions have pointed to the need for the gradual harmonization of policies and standards between the United Nations and regional organizations and arrangements. Efforts in the future should be geared towards closing the gap between United Nations and African Union predeployment standards and training in key areas, in order to facilitate future rehatting processes. There is also a need to strengthen the understanding between the United Nations and its partners on what certain mandates mean in practice, first and foremost those related to the protection of civilians, which are central to contemporary peacekeeping. The work of all organizations in this area would benefit from more systematic coordination on guidance, training and the sharing of lessons learned.

62. The new paradigm of "partnership peacekeeping" also highlights the need to broaden the understanding of partnerships beyond the bilateral relationships forged between the United Nations and individual regional organizations, or between regional organizations. The most obvious example is the simultaneous engagement of the United Nations, the African Union and the European Union in Africa. In many contexts, as made evident in the present report, this has become a de facto trilateral partnership. We must explore how better to exploit the great potential that that trilateral partnership can offer.

63. In a similar vein, the response mechanisms and capabilities available to each organization should not be looked at in isolation from each other. Instead, we should see how they can be combined most effectively and used more predictably, in particular in order to respond rapidly to acute crises, when thousands of lives are at risk. In that regard, I welcome the efforts of the African Union to fully operationalize ASF, a goal that will continue to be supported by the United Nations, as well as the continued discussions of the European Union on the operationalization of the European Union battlegroup. Given the magnitude of the peace and security challenges that the United Nations, the African Union and the European Union face together, it is imperative that they consider how those capacities can best complement each other to achieve the collective goal of mounting the most effective overall response to crises.

64. I also welcome the efforts and initiatives of other regional organizations and arrangements to strengthen their nascent peacekeeping capacities or develop new ones. The United Nations remains open to supporting such initiatives, in line with United Nations policies and standards, so that other regional organizations can eventually assume a greater role and further enrich today's peacekeeping partnership.

65. Finally, I would like to thank the African Union Commission and the European Union for their collaboration in preparing the present report, and all the regional organizations and arrangements partnering with the United Nations in the quest for peace.

United Nations S/2015/230

Security Council

Distr.: General
2 April 2015

Original: English

Letter dated 1 April 2015 from the Permanent Representative of Germany to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit to you a letter dated 1 April 2015 from the representative of the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Harald **Braun**
Permanent Representative of Germany
to the United Nations

15-05349 (E) 080415

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 1 April 2015 from the Permanent Representative of Germany to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

On behalf of the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, it is with great alarm that I draw your attention to a new set of chlorine gas attacks perpetrated by Syrian regime forces in and near the Syrian province of Idlib and the urgent need for the imposition of measures under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, as decided by Security Council resolutions 2118 (2013) and 2209 (2015).

On Monday, 30 March 2015, at approximately 1.30 a.m., Syrian regime helicopters dropped four barrel bombs containing a noxious chemical substance on the Syrian city of Idlib. On Tuesday, 31 March, regime helicopters dropped two more barrel bombs in the Idlib city centre, which caused 27 cases of suffocation due to the inhalation of a noxious chemical gas. These attacks came less than a week after a similar attack was launched on the towns surrounding Idlib. On 24 March, in the evening, Syrian aerial forces pounded the towns of Binnish and Qmenas with toxic chemical agents. Witnesses at the site reported the use of barrel bombs ejected from Syrian regime helicopters. At least 30 people, many of them children and women, received medical treatment for symptoms consistent with chlorine gas attacks, including nausea and difficulty in breathing.

The attacks on Idlib were not the first to be perpetrated following the adoption of Security Council resolution 2209 (2015). On 16 March, Syrian regime aerial forces launched yet another chlorine gas attack in Sarmin, Idlib. These attacks killed a family of six and left dozens of others wounded.

The chemical attacks on Sarmin, Binnish and Qmenas, like those on Kafr Zita and eastern Ghouta before them, have been committed with impunity. In resolutions 2118 (2013) and 2209 (2015), the Security Council decided to impose measures under Chapter VII of the Charter in the event of further breaches of the resolutions. There have been multiple further breaches, yet there are no measures, no accountability, no consequences. This impunity has aided and abetted Assad's atrocities. It has encouraged him to kill, torture and terrorize civilians, without fear of repercussions or meaningful consequences. It has also prolonged the conflict, fuelled the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, cost lives and damaged global security: the precise opposite of the Security Council's mandate.

Impunity must end now. Anyone who uses chemical weapons to target and kill civilians must be held accountable, and firm actions must be undertaken to deter the future use of the chemical agent chlorine gas as a weapon of war, as well as the disproportionate and indiscriminate use of conventional weapons. The legal basis already exists through which to deter future attacks. Members of the Council must work without delay:

- **To implement a no-fly zone**. A no-fly zone, implemented through the enforcement of Security Council resolutions 2118 (2013) and 2209 (2015), would put an immediate end to Assad's systematic deployment of chemical gas by air. It would protect Syrian civilians from aerial chemical warfare. It would enable humanitarian access and the eventual safe return of Syrian civilians to parts of the Syrian Arab Republic. And it would be implementable and enforceable. If the Security Council cannot act because of the irresponsible use

of the veto, concerned Member States have a legal and moral obligation to act unilaterally.

- **To refer the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic to the International Criminal Court**. The Security Council has repeatedly called for accountability, including in its resolutions 2118 (2013), 2139 (2014) and 2209 (2015). To date, a lack of consensus among Council members, however, has prevented the Council from authorizing the foremost instrument capable of delivering justice to victims: a referral of the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic to the International Criminal Court. Council members can and must break this deadlock by adopting a new resolution referring the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic to the Court. If the Council cannot act because of the irresponsible use of the veto, concerned Member States must set up an alternative mechanism, such as an ad hoc tribunal.

- **To authorize the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons fact-finding mission in the Syrian Arab Republic to determine responsibility for the chemical attacks in Idlib**. To date, the fact-finding mission has not been mandated to determine responsibility for the use of chlorine gas. This has allowed Assad to claim publicly and maliciously, as he did most recently on Sunday, 29 March, in an interview featured on *60 Minutes*, that he has not used chemical weapons against his own people. Such lies should be answered with incontrovertible truth, truth which the fact-finding mission could provide, were it to be mandated to determine responsibility. The deliberate neutering of the fact-finding mission by one member of the Security Council has shamefully encouraged a lack of accountability.

While we welcome the news that Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons investigators may investigate the chemical weapons attacks in the province of Idlib, we are also conscious that such investigations have not, to date, deterred the Assad regime. The fact-finding mission alone will not stop Assad's murders or prevent future deaths through chemical means. To stop Assad's killing, the Security Council must deny the regime's ability to kill by air. A no-fly zone remains the best and most feasible way to do so.

(*Signed*) Najib **Ghadbian**
Special Representative to the United Nations

United Nations S/2015/231

Security Council

Distr.: General
2 April 2015

Original: English

Letter dated 27 March 2015 from the Permanent Representative of Jordan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith the concept paper for the Security Council briefing on the theme "The role of youth in countering violent extremism and promoting peace" (see annex), which will be held on 23 April 2015.

I should be grateful if the present letter and its annex would be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Dina **Kawar**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

15-05385 (E) 090415

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 27 March 2015 from the Permanent Representative of Jordan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

The role of youth in countering violent extremism and promoting peace

Concept paper

In April 2015, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan will convene a high-level open debate on the theme "The role of youth in countering violent extremism and promoting peace".

Introduction

With a view to preventing terrorism and reducing the appeal of and support for terrorist groups, countering violent extremism efforts include initiatives focused on the prevention of radicalization, recruitment and mobilization of individuals into terrorist groups and becoming foreign terrorist fighters as an essential element in addressing the threat of terrorism to international peace and security. Violent extremism also fuels inter-community tensions, inhibits socioeconomic development and fosters regional and international insecurity.

The appeal of extremist ideologies to youth has increased over the past decade and ever younger foreign terrorist fighters are travelling in unprecedented numbers to join groups like Da`esh. A significant portion of such youth no longer contents itself with ideological sympathies, and decides to join radical and extremist groups. Al-Qaida and its affiliates have understood this reality and have been intensively targeting this demographic, taking advantage of several factors that are conducive to radicalization and violent extremism. This has been noticeable in numerous situations involving Al-Qaida, Da`esh and their affiliates throughout the world. In Mali, some fighters of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa and Ansar Eddine have been as young as 15 years old. While some were recruited as child soldiers, others were indoctrinated with Al-Qaida ideology. The Da`esh propaganda campaign has focused effectively on young candidates through a strategic communications campaign that resorts to footages depicting very young and "proud" fighters in its ranks, in order to attract their peers. In Somalia, Al-Shabaab has been using young fighters in its attacks and piracy acts, while Boko Haram depends on youth recruitment and has recently been using children as young as 8 years old in its suicide attacks.

In the same context, while the involvement of youth could be a part of the challenge related to violent extremism, youths themselves can also be the core of the solution. Urgent action is required at the national, subregional, regional and international levels, in order to address this issue and place youth at the centre of the global agenda to counter violent extremism.

Why are youth at the centre of the problem?

The rise of radicalization and violent extremism, especially among youth, is one of today's most pressing threats to peace, stability and development. Not only does it threaten security and stability, but when radicalized youth abandon their education and employment and endanger future generations, they derail development efforts and foment community tensions. Today's generation of youth is the largest the world has ever known and of the age group that is highly targeted by terrorist organizations. Radicalization among youth can and should be prevented, starting from an early age, by developing and using appropriate sustainable development strategies that meet their basic needs. Cooperation between all stakeholders is more vital now than ever before, if our ambition is to stop more youth radicalization throughout the world in the years to come.

Although radicalization can happen at any age, young people who are in search of a sense of belonging, purpose and/or identity tend to be more vulnerable to violent extremism and radicalization than any other age group. The challenge we face is that of violent extremists drawing on ideas and grievances that resonate with various audiences in order to recruit and exploit disaffected youth and offer them a false sense of purpose, belonging and identity.

What are the factors that lead to radicalization among youth?

A number of common denominators contribute to creating an environment that is conducive to terrorist recruitment and youth radicalization. To inform a solution, the international community should recognize the major factors that are conducive to youth radicalization. Push factors, which include socioeconomic and developmental drivers, as outlined in pillar I of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, can be combined with pull factors, like material or social incentives, as well as other related factors, to drive support for extremist groups and ideologies.

Push factors

Unmet expectations

Those who feel that their society as a whole has the least to offer, or who feel that they cannot achieve the goals that they had expected to achieve, are the most vulnerable to radicalization. Violent extremists are taking advantage of formal structures and informal networks and using all communication channels open to them to recruit youth into their organizations. Recruitment into a violent extremist organization may be driven by identified needs of the individual and, in this sense, does not differ from recruitment into any other type of organization. Youth gravitate towards those organizations because of what violent extremism networks may offer in terms of materials and socio-psychological support, such as money, protection and solidarity.

Unemployment and underemployment, as well as poverty, among youth are socioeconomic challenges that are evident in countries where violent extremist organizations operate. In 2013, an estimated 73 million young people were unemployed, according to the International Labour Organization. Also, the economic and social costs of unemployment, long-term unemployment,

discouragement and widespread low-quality jobs for young people continue to rise and undermine economic growth potential. It is easier for violent extremist groups to recruit unemployed youth who see no future for themselves than employed youth. A survey showed that respondents identified the high incidence of unemployment and poverty that prevail in the state as the second most important reason why youth engage in religious-based violence. The living conditions render highly vulnerable youth to manipulation by extremist ideologies.

Personal trauma

The experience of loss, through death or injury of a family member, personal injury or negative experiences, can create a "cognitive opening" that makes young people more receptive to violent extremist messaging and recruitment.

Personal or community grievances

A number of personal and social factors can contribute to creating conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism. Studies suggest that poverty, unemployment, illiteracy and weak family structures make, or contribute to making, young men and women vulnerable to radicalization, as extremist groups can position themselves to address some of these challenges. At the same time, even where extremist group members may not themselves experience these conditions, their activities are presented as responding on behalf of those who do.

Youth radicalization may often result from a combination of contextual and personal factors, such as a sense of alienation, exclusion, marginalization, deprivation, insecurity or victimization, felt on behalf of an individual or community. The conflicts, violence, oppression, corruption, illegitimate and abusive exercise of power, perceived enmities or historical grievances that those individuals endure fuel their exasperation and provide them with a convenient justification to resort to violent extremism. Also, the lack of a culture of tolerance and peaceful coexistence may contribute to radicalization. Similarly, the failure to integrate youth into local societies may also lead to their becoming vulnerable to extremism.

High levels of illiteracy may also be a contributor to youth radicalization and extremism. While it is evident that illiteracy does not manufacture the bombs that terrorist organizations use, arrest records indicate that the "real armies of suicide bombers and terrorists' foot soldiers" are drawn from such "disadvantaged, stranded populations"; and that poverty, lack of education and indoctrination may contribute to terrorism. Moreover, illiteracy renders young people more susceptible to the messaging and narratives of extremist groups, as they lack the means to verify or challenge the ideas themselves.

Violent extremist groups have been very strategic in exploiting these vulnerabilities through effective recruitment strategies and social media and other online platforms in order to lull potential members into their hands. Such groups can manipulate information and exploit the political and ideological idealism of the youth through the effective use of propaganda. Considering that youth are the biggest consumers of social media, slick videos with soundtracks and messaging in their own language are utilized to engage them, but such tools can also be used to contest the extremists in this space.

How can the threat be mitigated?

Addressing conditions conducive to the spread of violent extremism

International organizations and local governments need to focus on addressing the conditions that are conducive to the spread of terrorism and violent extremism, as highlighted in the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. This includes by creating social and economic development policies, supporting projects designed to grow local economies, fostering education and promoting youth entrepreneurship and constructive political engagement. In order to do that, international organizations need to partner with local governments to develop strategies and initiatives to give youth the necessary skills, resources and opportunities to succeed. This includes access to quality education and health care, support of family and social networks, political empowerment and availability of employment opportunities. Moreover, although the State has the primary responsibility in addressing the challenges through, inter alia, allowing democratic participation, civic engagement, access to health and social services and economic and employment opportunities, direct engagement by civil societies and non-governmental organizations is essential to engage youth and encourage them to speak against violent extremist networks.

Strengthening public-private partnerships

More attention should be paid to basic youth developmental needs and the prevention of youth violence, exploitation and neglect. Collaborative efforts between public and private agencies are also needed to provide pro-social opportunities to youth and parents in the most affected communities. This could include partnerships between the media and communities to amplify alternative narratives and moderate voices, and reveal the negative aspects of extremist groups to vulnerable audiences. The Governments should appreciate the importance of a social media campaign in order to counter the messages of radical terrorist organizations. Governments should make use of all available media channels to help counter violent extremist messages and to expose the true nature of those organizations. In addition, engaging young online activists and youth organizations is crucial. Possible initiatives in this regard should include the creation of online networks of young activists and the provision of training in online campaigning against intolerance and discrimination.

Empowering and educating youth

Governments also need to take part in empowering national youth who speak the local language, understand their culture and are able to contextualize the issues in a way that is relevant and powerful to their people. The right "messenger" is key in discussing the implications of violent extremism within his or her own community and providing outlets for the youth and people affected by this phenomenon. Enhancing community engagement with civic duties, religious leaders and social service groups will provide opportunities for youth to learn about conflict prevention, conflict resolution and dialogue engagement.

Ensuring that young people have access to quality education and support can enhance their abilities to challenge extremist narratives and provide positive alternatives rooted in traditional cultures and practices. Educational institutions,

religious establishments and civil society groups are often unprepared or ill-equipped to address the critical topic of violent extremism. Such institutions need to be empowered to play a targeted and proactive role in preventing this growing threat against youth by promoting peace education. Governments, at all levels, should partner with credible civil society organizations to design and implement effective reorientation programmes for impoverished children and youth, in order to provide them with the support and training they need to function effectively in society. Sports, arts and culture activities and initiatives are also critical vehicles for developing culturally relevant and resonant alternatives to extremist messages and offering young people positive narratives, and they can often effectively leverage existing resources in countries that may be underutilized in this regard.

All stakeholders need to underline the necessity of programmes and initiatives that promote tolerance and coexistence. In order to promote tolerance, States need to initiate religious dialogue and educational initiatives that will provide students with the knowledge and skills needed to understand and reject this radical ideology and promote counter-narratives based on human rights and democracy.

Supporting youth and youth-oriented organizations

The potential contribution to, and the inclusion of young people in, effective peacebuilding has received little attention and support. The role of youth is essential for achieving an integrated sustained approach in post-conflict peacebuilding and for ensuring that the needs of all segments of society are taken into account in this phase of strengthening peace and security, as well as building national institutions in the countries emerging from conflicts. The inclusion of youth in peacebuilding requires national policies and strategies that strengthen the capacity and skills of this important category of a society. Countries in conflict or emerging from conflict are encouraged to focus on identifying youth priorities and providing guidance to them, which is key to supporting the critical role that they can play in all peace and security efforts, including mitigating the impact of conflicts on societies.

How can youth themselves counter violent extremism?

Youth and youth-oriented organizations can play a critical role, as positive role models that influence and inspire peers to challenge violent extremism. Such individuals typically stimulate young people to make sound life choices and to advance their educational outcomes and assist them in developing skills, values and other attributes that encourage citizenship and lead to a full and productive adulthood for the benefit of the community and the economy. Incorporating young leaders into educational, community and workplace settings is important; they can be an influence on their peers and can motivate a vision for peace against violent extremism.

Youth can counter violent extremism by taking part in and leading educational and civil society initiatives that will provide young people with the knowledge and skills needed to understand and reject this radical ideology and to promote counter-narratives based on human rights, tolerance and democracy. Engagement in these programmes will influence their peers to assist in the efforts to promote peace and provide them with a foundation to have an educated attitude towards violent extremism.

Youth can build resilience in combating this phenomenon through the use of information technologies and by contesting extremist narratives, both online and offline. Journalists and social media activists can use their peer influence to tackle extremist ideologies by resisting radical content online and acknowledging biases in the news. However, it is also important to ensure that they have a safe space to do this.

Young women can be powerful agents of change and play a crucial role in developing responses to violence, and challenging and delegitimizing extremist violence. They often have a unique role in families and communities and are often active in public and civil society efforts, and can play important roles in contributing to community resilience. It is essential that strategies be specific and provide resources to empower young women to play such a proactive role in the socioeconomic and educational structures.

What role can the United Nations play in furthering these efforts?

The United Nations, in particular the Security Council, can play a critical role in addressing this phenomenon. Already, Security Council resolutions, such as resolutions 1624 (2005) and 2178 (2014), highlighted the need to prevent incitement to terrorism and undertake preventive measures to stem the flow of foreign fighters through countering violent extremism. To further build on these objectives and to address the role of youth in countering violent extremism, the Security Council could:

- Request the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate to develop a report with input from relevant actors, including the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team established pursuant to Security Council resolutions 1267 (1999), 1988 (2011) and 1989 (2011), the United Office on Drugs and Crime, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Alliance of Civilizations and the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women to develop an in-depth and joint analysis about the nexus between youth, violent extremism and sustainable development, and to include recommendations for measures to address this challenge in the context of implementing resolution 2178 (2014), including through engagement with civil society and private sector
- Call on the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force to work with Member States to support the development of programmes based on this analysis, which focus on youth and countering violent extremism programming
- Call for greater coordination on this issue with relevant United Nations entities, including the United Nations counter-terrorism entities, the Office of the Secretary-General's Envoy on Youth, UNDP and UNESCO
- The World Programme of Action for Youth should include a new priority area that addresses countering violent extremism and terrorism and enhancing youth resilience
- Consider the occasion of the tenth anniversary of resolution 1624 (2014) to highlight efforts to address incitement to terrorism and request the

Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate to facilitate an exchange of lessons learned and good practices on implementation, with a particular focus on youth radicalization and social media.

To frame the Council discussion in April, Member States may wish to address the following topics, among others:

- Specific initiatives in their own countries that are already developed, for and by youth, in order to counter violent extremism among youth
- Implementation of programmes to prevent and counter youth radicalization among youth
- The nexus between youth, violent extremism, socioeconomic issues, sustainable development and employment complications in regard to youth.

United Nations S/2015/232

Security Council

Distr.: General
15 April 2015

Original: English

Note verbale dated 2 April 2015 from the Permanent Observer of the League of Arab States to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

The office of the Permanent Observer of the League of Arab States to the United Nations presents its complements to the Office of the President of the Security Council, (Jordan) and, with reference to the twenty-sixth Arab Summit held in Sharm el-Sheikh in Egypt on 28 and 29 March 2015, has the honour to attach herewith five letters addressed to the President of the Security Council, in addition to resolutions 627, 620, 623, 625 and 624 of the Council of the League of Arab States (see annex) regarding:

- The occupation by Iran of the three Arab Islands in the Arabian Gulf belonging to the United Arab Emirates: the Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa
- Solidarity with and support to Lebanon
- Dangerous developments in the Syrian Arab Republic, Yemen and Libya

It would be highly appreciated if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

15-05895 (E) 170415 170415

Please recycle

Annex to the note verbale dated 2 April 2015 from the Permanent Observer of the League of Arab States to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

[Original: Arabic]

2 April 2015

League of Arab States
Permanent Observer Mission to the United Nations

On instructions from the Secretariat of the League of Arab States, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith resolution 627 entitled "The occupation by the Islamic Republic of Iran of the three Arab islands in the Arabian Gulf belonging to the United Arab Emirates: the Greater Tunb, the Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa", adopted by the Council of the League of Arab States at its 26th session at the summit level, which was held at Sharm el-Sheikh on 28 and 29 March 2015 (see annex). We draw your attention to paragraph 12 of the resolution in which the Council of the League requests that the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the President of the Security Council should be informed of the importance of maintaining the issue on the list of matters of which the Security Council is seized, until Iran ends its occupation of the three Arab islands and the United Arab Emirates regains its full sovereignty over them.

I should be grateful if you would arrange for the present letter and the aforementioned resolution to be circulated to the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council, in accordance with Article 54 of the Charter of the United Nations.

(*Signed*) Nasria Elardja **Flitti**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

The occupation by Iran of the three Arab islands in the Arabian Gulf belonging to the United Arab Emirates: the Greater Tunb, the Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa

The Council of the League at the summit level,

Having considered:

The note of the Secretariat,

The report of the Secretary-General on joint Arab action,

Guided by previous summit resolutions, the most recent of which was resolution 510 of the Sirte summit (22nd ordinary session) dated 28 March 2010, regarding the occupation by Iran of the three Arab islands in the Arabian Gulf belonging to the United Arab Emirates: the Greater Tunb, the Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa,

Reaffirming the resolutions adopted and the communiqués issued on the same matter by the Council at the ministerial level, the most recent of which were resolution 7875 (143rd ordinary session) of 7 September 2014 and communiqué No. 195 (143rd ordinary session) of 9 March 2015,

Decides

1. To reaffirm without qualification the absolute sovereignty of the United Arab Emirates over its three islands of the Greater Tunb, the Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa and to support all peaceful measures and means adopted by the United Arab Emirates to regain its sovereignty over the occupied islands;

2. To denounce the continued consolidation by the Iranian Government of its occupation of the three islands and its violation of the sovereignty of the United Arab Emirates, which can only undermine security and stability in the region and pose a threat to international peace and security;

3. To condemn the building by the Iranian Government of housing facilities to settle Iranians on the three occupied islands of the United Arab Emirates;

4. To condemn the Iranian military manoeuvres being conducted also on the three occupied islands of the United Arab Emirates, namely, the Greater Tunb, the Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa, and in those islands' territorial waters, airspace, continental shelf and exclusive economic zone, which constitute an inseparable part of the United Arab Emirates; and to request that Iran desist from such violations and acts of provocation, which constitute interference in the internal affairs of an independent, sovereign State; do not promote confidence-building; threaten security and stability in the region; and endanger the security and safety of regional and international navigation in the Arabian Gulf;

5. To condemn the opening by Iran of two offices on the island of Abu Musa, which belongs to the United Arab Emirates, and to call upon Iran to close down those illegitimate facilities and respect the sovereignty of the United Arab Emirates over its territory;

6. To denounce and condemn the planned fact-finding visit of the members of the National Security and Foreign Policy Committee of the Iranian Consultative Assembly to the occupied islands belonging to the United Arab Emirates, namely,

the Greater Tunb, the Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa, an act that would violate the sovereignty of the United Arab Emirates over its territory and would be inconsistent with attempts to find a peaceful settlement; and to call upon Iran to desist from taking such provocative steps;

7. To commend the United Arab Emirates on its initiative to find a peaceful and just settlement to the question of the three occupied islands (the Greater Tunb, the Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa) with the Islamic Republic of Iran;

8. To appeal once again to the Iranian Government to end its occupation of the three islands of the United Arab Emirates, refrain from trying to impose a fait accompli by force, desist from establishing any installations there for the purpose of modifying the islands' demographic structure, revoke all measures unilaterally taken and remove all installations built by Iran on the three Arab islands, inasmuch as such measures and claims are null and void, lack any legal effect, do not detract from the established right of the United Arab Emirates over its three islands and are acts that run counter to the provisions of international law and the Geneva Conventions of 1949; and to call upon the Iranian Government to adopt peaceful means for resolving the existing dispute over them in accordance with the principles and norms of international law, including agreement to refer the matter to the International Court of Justice;

9. To express the hope that the Islamic Republic of Iran will reconsider its position of rejecting the effort to find a peaceful solution to the question of the three occupied islands of the United Arab Emirates either through direct, earnest negotiations or through recourse to the International Court of Justice;

10. To call upon Iran to translate its stated desire for improved relations with the Arab countries and for dialogue and détente into practical measures, both in word and in deed, in the form of a genuine response to the earnest appeals launched by His Highness Sheikh Khalifa Bin Zayed Al Nahyan, President of the United Arab Emirates, and by the States members of the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Arab States, international groups, friendly nations and the Secretary-General of the United Nations, calling for a solution to the dispute over the three occupied islands by peaceful means in accordance with customary practice and the covenants and rules of international law, either through direct, earnest negotiations or through recourse to the International Court of Justice, with a view to building trust and enhancing security and stability in the Arabian Gulf region;

11. To have all Arab States undertake, in their contacts with Iran, to raise the issue of that country's occupation of the three islands in order to stress the need to end it, based on the fact that the three islands are occupied Arab territory;

12. To inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the President of the Security Council of the importance of maintaining the issue on the list of matters of which the Security Council is seized until Iran ends its occupation of the three Arab islands and the United Arab Emirates regains its full sovereignty over them;

13. To request the Secretary-General of the League to follow up this matter and report to the Council of the League at its next session.

(Summit resolution 627 — 26th ordinary session — 29 March 2015)

2 April 2015

League of Arab States
Permanent Observer Mission to the United Nations

On instructions from the Secretariat of the League of Arab States, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith resolution 620 entitled "Solidarity with and support for Lebanon", adopted by the Council of the League of Arab States at its 26th session at the summit level, which was held at Sharm el-Sheikh on 28 and 29 March 2015 (see annex). We draw your attention to paragraph 2 of the resolution, in which the Council of the League affirms its support for Lebanon's call on the international community to implement Security Council resolution 1701 (2006), and paragraph 6, in which the Council welcomes General Assembly resolution 69/212 of December 2014 regarding the oil slick on Lebanese shores. The latter resolution requires Israel to provide financial compensation for the damage inflicted upon Lebanon during Israel's bombing of the Jiyeh electric power plant during the July 2006 war.

I should be grateful if you would arrange for the present letter and the aforementioned resolution to be circulated to the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council under the agenda item on the situation in the Middle East, in accordance with Article 54 of the Charter of the United Nations.

(*Signed*) Nasria Elardja **Flitti**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

Question of Palestine and the Arab-Israeli conflict

Solidarity with and support for Lebanon

The Council of the League at the summit level,

Having considered:

The note of the Secretariat,

The report of the Secretary-General on joint Arab action,

Resolution 7738 (141st ordinary session) dated 9 March 2014 on the negative and dangerous repercussions of the Syrian displaced person crisis on Lebanon,

The Council's resolutions at the ministerial level, the most recent being resolution 7863 (143rd ordinary session) dated 7 March 2015,

The recommendation made by the Follow-up Committee for the Implementation of Resolutions and Commitments at the ministerial level on 7 September 2014,

Reaffirming the resolutions of the Arab summit conferences, the most recent being the Kuwait summit (2014), particularly resolution 599 (25th ordinary session) dated 26 March 2014, concerning support for the Lebanese Army,

Noting the latest domestic, regional and international developments involving Lebanon,

Recalling the relevant international resolutions, to which the Lebanese Government remains committed, particularly the entirety of resolution 1701 (2006), which is based on Security Council resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978),

Decides

1. To reaffirm full Arab solidarity with Lebanon; to provide political and economic support to Lebanon and its Government in order to safeguard Lebanese national unity and Lebanon's security, stability and sovereignty over its entire territory; to emphasize the right of the Lebanese people to liberate or recover the Lebanese Shab'a Farms, the hills of Kafr Shuba and the Lebanese portion of the town of Ghajar; to uphold their right to use all available legitimate means to resist any aggression; and to emphasize the need to distinguish between terrorism and legitimate resistance against Israeli occupation. The latter is a right enshrined in international instruments and the principles of international law. Acts of resistance therefore cannot be considered acts of terrorism.

2. To support Lebanon's call on the international community to implement Security Council resolution 1701 (2006), which is based on resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978), by putting a definitive end to Israel's violations and constant threats against Lebanon and its civilian facilities and infrastructure.

3. To welcome and endorse the conclusions adopted by the successive meetings of the International Support Group for Lebanon, the most recent of which was held in Berlin on 28 October 2014.

4. To commend the national role of the Lebanese Army and security forces in maintaining domestic stability and peace and supporting efforts to extend the

Lebanese Government's sovereignty as far as its internationally recognized borders; to commend the sacrifices made by the Lebanese Army in its fight against terrorism and terrorist and *takfirist* organizations, including the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and Nusrah Front; to condemn the reprehensible attacks against several areas of Lebanon; to welcome the assistance provided to Lebanon by friendly countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, which has donated $4 billion; to urge all States to emulate that initiative in order to strengthen the Lebanese Army's capacity and enable it to act as the cornerstone of security, stability and civil peace in Lebanon; and to condemn the abduction of two Lebanese soldiers by ISIL and the Nusrah Front in August 2014 and demand their release in order to thwart the schemes of those wishing to ignite domestic and regional strife.

5. To condemn all of the criminal acts, armed deployments and terrorist bombings that have targeted several areas of Lebanon, killing many innocent civilians; to reject all futile attempts to sow discord, undermine the foundations of coexistence, civil peace and national unity and disrupt security and stability; to emphasize the need to combat extremism, fanaticism and *takfirism*; to cooperate and coordinate fully in order to fight and eradicate terrorism; to eliminate the sources of terrorist financing; to cooperate by sharing information and expertise, building capacity, and holding accountable the perpetrators of terrorist acts and crimes against humanity and those who incite violent and destructive acts that endanger peace and security; and to tighten sanctions against them and take preventive measures in that regard.

6. To commend Lebanon's steadfast resistance to the ongoing Israeli aggression, particularly the July 2006 aggression; to pray for God's mercy on the souls of the Lebanese victims; to stress that the Lebanese people's cohesion and unity in confronting and resisting the Israeli aggression are a guarantee of the country's future, security and stability; to characterize Israeli crimes as war crimes whose perpetrators must be prosecuted; to hold Israel fully responsible for its attacks and prevail upon it to compensate the Republic of Lebanon and its citizens; to welcome General Assembly resolution 69/212 of December 2014 regarding the oil slick on Lebanese shores, which requires Israel to provide financial compensation for the damage inflicted on Lebanon when Israel bombed the Jiyeh electric power plant during the July 2006 war.

7. To condemn Israeli land, sea and air violations of Lebanese sovereignty, including:

- The Israeli penetration of Lebanese society through the planting of agents and propagation of espionage networks;
- Israeli violations of Lebanon's sovereign and economic rights in its territorial waters and exclusive economic zone, its water resources, and its oil and gas resources located in its maritime areas;
- The all-out electronic warfare which Israel is waging against the Republic of Lebanon, as reflected in the growing number of towers, antennas and devices for observation, spying and surveillance, all of which are intended for piracy and espionage against all Lebanese communication and data networks;

- Israel's refusal to hand over complete, accurate information and maps pertaining to the locations of all unexploded ordnances, their quantity, and the types of cluster bombs which it dropped indiscriminately on populated civilian areas during its attack on Lebanon in the summer of 2006.

8. To underscore the following points:

- That there is a need to safeguard Lebanon's unique pluralistic formula, which is based on equality between Muslims and Christians, religious coexistence, dialogue, tolerance and mutual acceptance; to condemn its diametric antithesis, namely such nihilist terrorist organizations as ISIL and the Nusrah Front, whose crimes against humanity mimic Israel's exclusivist policies based on the Jewish character of the State and its acts of hostility against Arab Muslims and Christians.

- That the Lebanese Government must be supported in its policy of promoting Lebanon's Arab and international presence and spreading its message of cultural diversity, particularly in confronting Israel; that minorities must be protected as original, fundamental components of the social fabric of the States in the region; that minority rights must be safeguarded and attacks against them prevented; and that such crimes must be characterized as crimes against humanity.

- That the Lebanese Government must be supported in complying with its constitutional obligation to reject resettlement and uphold the right of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes; and that the Palestinian people and leadership deserve credit for their unequivocal and consistent rejection of the resettlement of Palestinian refugees in host countries, particularly in Lebanon.

- That the Lebanese Government must be supported in its efforts to follow up on the disappearance of Imam Musa al-Sadr and his two associates, Sheikh Muhammad Ya'qub and the journalist Abbas Badruldin, in order to free them, hold accountable officials of the former Libyan regime, and close the case.

9. To welcome the following:

The commitment of the Lebanese Government to comply with the authoritative international resolutions and to bring to light the facts surrounding the assassination of the late Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and members of his entourage, and to do so without politicization or reprisal, which would adversely affect Lebanon's stability, unity and civil peace.

- The efforts of the Lebanese Government and people, despite the country's limited resources, to host Syrians and Palestinian refugees displaced from Syria; to emphasize the need to assist Lebanon in that regard, to share the burden, including the numbers of refugees involved, and to stem the growth of the problem; to emphasize that the presence of those displaced persons in Lebanon is temporary, in the light of the existential threat that it poses to the country; to make every effort to ensure they return to their homes as soon as possible; to commend the Lebanese Government's intensive attempts to reduce the number of displaced Syrians in Lebanon and to guarantee the security of both Lebanese and Syrians; and to reduce the burden borne by the country and

its economy, as Lebanon finds itself on the brink of a social, economic and security cataclysm that endangers its very existence.

- The initiative taken by Lebanon to appeal to the International Criminal Court prosecutor to bring charges in respect of Israel's war crimes in Gaza and the ongoing crimes against humanity committed by terrorists in Iraq.
- The Lebanese Government's efforts to develop and implement its economic reform policy and foster sustainable economic growth in order to modernize the national economic structure, preserve its stability and enhance opportunities for growth.
- The ongoing dialogue among Lebanese political stakeholders, a dialogue aimed at resolving their differences, easing political tension, promoting national reconciliation and coexistence and advancing the work of Government and national institutions in order to preserve Lebanon's unity, security and stability.
- The efforts of the Secretary-General and the Secretariat of the League of Arab States; and the efforts of the Arab ministerial delegation headed by His Excellency Sheikh Sabah Khalid Al Hamad Al Sabah, First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Kuwait, in support of the Lebanese Republic.

(Summit resolution 620 — 26th ordinary session — 29 March 2015)

2 April 2015

League of Arab States
Permanent Observer Mission to the United Nations

On instructions from the Secretariat of the League of Arab States, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith resolution 623 entitled "Dangerous developments in the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic", adopted by the Council of the League of Arab States at its 26th session at the summit level, which was held at Sharm el-Sheikh on 28 and 29 March 2015 (see annex). We draw your attention to paragraphs 2, 4 and 5 of the resolution in which the Council of the League reaffirms that the Security Council should bear fully its responsibility to respond to all developments in the Syrian crisis, and to implement its relevant resolutions.

I should be grateful if you would arrange for the present letter and the aforementioned resolution to be circulated to the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council, in accordance with Article 54 of the Charter of the United Nations.

(*Signed*) Nasria Elardja **Flitti**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

Dangerous developments in the Syrian Arab Republic

The Council of the League at the summit level,

Having considered:

The note of the Secretariat,

The report of the Secretary-General on joint Arab action,

Recalling previous summit resolutions, including resolution 554 of the Baghdad summit (23rd ordinary session) dated 29 March 2012, resolution 578 of the Doha summit (24th ordinary session) dated 26 March 2013 and resolution 600 of the Kuwait summit (25th ordinary session) dated 26 March 2014; all resolutions on the same matter adopted by the Council at the ministerial level, the most recent of which was resolution 7872 (143rd ordinary session); and the communiqués issued by the ministerial committee on the situation in Syria,

Reaffirming its unwavering position in support of the unity, stability and territorial integrity of Syria,

Taking into account the statements made by the heads of delegations and the Secretary-General of the League,

Decides

1. To express its profound concern at the worsening of the Syrian crisis and the grave repercussions thereof for the future of Syria and its security, stability, national unity and territorial integrity, and at the severe human suffering endured by the Syrian people because of the intensification of the destruction, violence, killing and the horrific crimes committed against civilians, in flagrant violation of human rights principles and international humanitarian law, and the sustained increase to which that intensification has led in the number of those who have been displaced or made refugees, both in Syria and neighbouring countries;

2. To reaffirm once again that the Security Council should bear fully its responsibility to respond to all developments in the Syrian crisis; to request the Secretary-General of the League to continue consultations and remain in contact with the Secretary-General of the United Nations and his Special Envoy for Syria, Mr. Staffan de Mistura, as well as all the relevant parties, with a view to making progress towards the adoption of a joint action plan that will ensure the resolution of the Syrian crisis by political means, in accordance with the communiqué of the first Geneva conference issued on 30 June 2012 and so as to fulfil the aspirations of the Syrian people, in all its components;

3. To welcome the outcomes of the Cairo and Moscow meetings and the efforts made at those meetings to revive the process aimed at reaching a negotiated political solution to the Syrian crisis on the basis of the communiqué of the first Geneva conference, while stressing the importance of coordinating the various efforts being made at the Arab and international levels to achieve that goal;

4. To reaffirm the substance of Security Council resolution 2209 (2015) in which the Security Council condemns the use of toxic chlorine gas in Syria, reiterates that no party in Syria should use, develop, produce, stockpile, retain or transfer chemical weapons, and stresses that those individuals responsible for the use of such weapons must be held accountable;

5. To reaffirm the necessity of complying with Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014) and 2191 (2014) on the deteriorating situation of human rights in Syria, and to call on the Security Council to shoulder its responsibility to implement those resolutions and take the measures required to impose an immediate ceasefire and a halt to hostilities, so as to facilitate relief operations and enable convoys carrying humanitarian assistance to reach all besieged and devastated areas of Syria;

6. To commend the decision of Kuwait to host the third International Humanitarian Pledging Conference for Syria on 31 March 2015; call on donor States to fulfil quickly the pledges they made at the second International Humanitarian Pledging Conference for Syria, which was held on 14 January 2014 with the support of His Highness Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, particularly the pledges made to provide the necessary assistance to the countries neighbouring Syria and other Arab States that are hosting Syrian refugees and displaced persons, in order to help them bear the burden of providing those persons with urgent relief and humanitarian assistance; and request the Secretariat to continue working with those States that are hosting Syrian refugees and displaced persons, particularly the neighbouring States of Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq, in order to provide them with the assistance they need;

7. To welcome the chairing by the Arab Republic of Egypt of the 26th summit of the ministerial committee on Syria, and to express great thanks to the committee for its efforts under the leadership of His Excellency Sheikh Sabah Khalid Al Hamad Al Sabah, First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Kuwait, who chaired the 25th summit;

8. To request the ministerial committee on Syria and the Secretary-General to continue to work and consult with the relevant regional and international parties concerning developments in the situation in Syria, and to make recommendations on future Arab action in that regard to the Council of the League at the ministerial level.

(Summit resolution 623 — 26th ordinary session — 29 March 2015)

* Lebanon reaffirms its position of keeping its distance from the Syrian crisis and that it hopes for Syrian reconciliation and encourages a political solution in Syria.

2 April 2015

League of Arab States
Permanent Observer Mission to the United Nations

On instructions from the Secretariat of the League of Arab States, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith resolution 625 entitled "Dangerous developments in the Republic of Yemen", adopted by the Council of the League of Arab States at its 26th session at the summit level, which was held in Sharm el-Sheikh on 28 and 29 March 2015 (see annex). The resolution emphasizes that the Arab States stand firmly alongside Yemen and support its constitutional authorities, particularly His Excellency President Abdrabuh Mansour Hadi Mansour. They fully welcome and support the coalition's military operations in defence of the legitimate authority in Yemen, and call on States members and on the international community to provide the necessary political, security, economic and financial support.

I should be grateful if you would arrange for the present letter and the aforementioned resolution to be circulated to the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council, in accordance with Article 54 of the Charter of the United Nations.

(*Signed*) Nasria Elardja **Flitti**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

Dangerous developments in the Republic of Yemen

The Council of the League at the summit level,

Having considered:

The note of the Secretariat,

The note of the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Yemen to the League, dated 8 March 2015,

The report of the Secretary-General on joint Arab action,

Having heard the address of His Excellency the President of the Republic of Yemen and the statements made by heads of delegation and the Secretary-General,

Decides

1. To assert its ongoing support for the constitutional authorities represented by His Excellency President Abdrabuh Mansour Hadi Mansour of the Republic of Yemen and his patriotic endeavour to preserve the Yemeni State and institutions and to re-launch the political process; to reaffirm, in accordance with the Gulf Cooperation Council initiative and its implementing mechanism, their support for the outcomes of the National Dialogue Conference, which were endorsed by all Yemeni parties; and to reaffirm the contents of the pertinent resolutions adopted by the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Council of the League of Arab States and the Security Council, all of which support constitutional authority in Yemen and condemn and sanction any party that hinders or undermines the political process;

2. To reaffirm the need for a full commitment to preserving Yemen's unity and territorial integrity; respect for the country's sovereignty and independence; rejection of any interference in its domestic affairs; support for the Yemeni people's aspirations for freedom, democracy and social justice; and action to enable the Yemeni people to achieve the comprehensive development towards which it strives.

3. To reject and condemn the steps taken by the Houthi group in an act of unilateral escalation, steps that amount to a coup, ignore constitutional authority and the popular will as expressed in the outcomes of the National Dialogue Conference, and obstruct the political transition process.

4. To fully welcome and support the military operations in defence of legitimate authority in Yemen undertaken, at the invitation of the President of the Republic of Yemen, by the coalition composed of the States members of the Gulf Cooperation Council and a number of Arab States. Such action is grounded in the Arab Treaty of Joint Defence and Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. It stems from the coalition's responsibility to preserve the safety, national unity, sovereignty and independence of the Arab countries.

5. To express the hope that the emergency military operations will restore safety and security to Yemen under its constitutional leaders, and will counteract any attempt on the part of the Houthi group, with the backing of foreign parties, to undermine the security of Yemen, the region and the Arab nation and endanger international peace and security by thwarting the will of the Yemeni people, sowing discord and destroying the county's social fabric and national unity.

6. To demand that the Houthi group immediately withdraw from Sana'a and other towns, and from Government institutions and facilities; restore normality in the capital and other governorates; and return its heavy and medium weapons to the legitimate constitutional authorities.

7. To respond swiftly to the Yemeni President's call for a conference aimed at political dialogue to be held in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, under the auspices of the Gulf Cooperation Council, with the participation of all Yemeni political actors committed to the security and stability of Yemen; and to commend the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, King Salman Bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud of Saudi Arabia, for announcing that he will host that conference in Riyadh;

8. To welcome the statement of the President of the Security Council dated 22 March 2015, which, first, requires the Houthi group and their allies to bring an end to their repeated attacks on all Yemeni governorates, particularly Ta'izz and Aden, and respond to the appeal of the Yemeni President to preserve constitutional authority and implementation of the Gulf Cooperation Council initiative and the Security Council resolutions in support thereof, and, second, imposes intensified sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations against all parties that violate the resolutions of the Security Council and assist the Houthi militias.

9. To stress that all Arab States members of the League stand by the leaders and people of Yemen in their ongoing open war on terrorism and piracy.

10. To stress the need for swift measures to tackle the difficult and serious humanitarian situation facing Yemen. Humanitarian conditions and living standards have deteriorated. The country's plight has become particularly acute and dangerous owing to the growing number of people in urgent need of immediate emergency humanitarian assistance; 16 million people now face an acute and dangerous shortage of food and medical care.

11. To call on States members and on the international community to provide the necessary political, security, economic and financial support in order to enable the Republic of Yemen to confront the challenges it faces, swiftly meet the country's development needs, ensure stability and complete the arrangements for the success of the transitional phase.

(Summit resolution 625 — 26th ordinary session — 29 March 2015)

* With regard to paragraphs 4 and 5 of the draft resolution, Iraq rejects military intervention on the part of any State in the affairs of any other State, and calls for dialogue and mutual understanding in order to resolve the situation.

* The position of the Lebanese Republic regarding the issue of Yemen is as follows: Lebanon endorses the consensus Arab position, which supports constitutional authority in all Arab States and calls for peaceful political solutions to Arab crises and non-intervention in the internal affairs of Arab States. Lebanon therefore emphasizes the need to pursue any position that enjoys consensus at the Arab level, and rejects any step that fails to secure Arab consensus or agreement. Lebanon stresses the need to swiftly establish a joint Arab force in order to preserve Arab national security and combat terrorism.

2 April 2015

League of Arab States
Permanent Observer Mission to the United Nations

On instructions from the Secretariat of the League of Arab States, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith resolution 624 entitled "Dangerous developments in Libya", adopted by the Council of the League of Arab States at its 26th session at the summit level, which was held at Sharm el-Sheikh on 28 and 29 March 2015 (see annex). We draw your attention to paragraphs 3 and 4 of the resolution. In the former, the Council of the League welcomes the adoption of Security Council resolution 2214 (2015), by which the Security Council calls upon the United Nations committee established to monitor the arms embargo to consider expeditiously requests for arms and materiel submitted by the Libyan Government in order to enable it to combat terrorism. In the latter, the Council of the League calls on the Security Council to establish a mechanism to prevent the transfer by sea and by air of arms and materiel to terrorist organizations and groups that continue to undermine the capacities of the Libyan people and claim lives.

I should be grateful if you would arrange for the present letter and the aforementioned resolution to be circulated to the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council under the item on the situation in the Middle East, in accordance with Article 54 of the Charter of the United Nations.

(*Signed*) Nasria Elardja **Flitti**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

Dangerous developments in Libya

The Council of the League at the summit level,

Having considered:

The note of the Secretariat,

The report on the Secretary-General on joint Arab action,

The declaration adopted by the 25th ordinary Arab summit held in Kuwait on 26 March 2014;

Reaffirming its commitment to the resolutions and declarations of the Council of the League concerning developments in the State of Libya, the most recent being resolution 7806 (142nd ordinary session) dated 7 September 2014, resolution 7552 (extraordinary session at the ministerial level) dated 15 January 2015, and resolution 7873 (143rd ordinary session) dated 9 March 2015;

Welcoming the resumption of the Libyan national dialogue in Morocco under the auspices of Special Representative Bernardino León, and welcoming the positive atmosphere during those sessions;

Welcoming and supporting the meeting of Libyan political parties hosted by the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria and convened under the auspices of Special Representative Bernardino León;

Commending the work of Nasser Al-Kidwa, the Secretary-General's envoy on Libya;

Endorsing the efforts made by Arab States within the United Nations, particularly the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, as the Arab State member of the Security Council, efforts that led to the submission to the Security Council of a draft Arab resolution on combating terrorism in Libya and, hence, to the adoption of Security Council resolution 2214 (2015);

Commending the efforts of the transitional Government of Libya to combat the terrorist organization known as ISIL, groups that have pledged allegiance to that organization and other individuals, groups and entities associated with Al-Qaida in Libya,

Decides

1. To reaffirm the need to respect Libya's unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity, refrain from intervening in its domestic affairs, preserve its political independence, commit to comprehensive dialogue between political forces that renounce violence and extremism, and support the political process under the auspices of the Special Representative of the United Nations in Libya.

2. To offer its full political and material support to the legitimate Government and provide it with any necessary assistance with a view to maintaining and safeguarding Libyan sovereignty, including by supporting the national army so that it can continue working to eradicate terrorism and establish security in Libya.

3. To welcome Security Council resolution 2214 (2015), adopted on 27 March 2015, which had been submitted by the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the Arab State member of the Security Council, with a view to combating terrorism

in Libya. That resolution calls on the United Nations committee established to monitor the arms embargo to consider expeditiously requests for arms from the Libyan Government to enable it to confront terrorism.

4. To call on the Security Council to establish a mechanism to prevent the transfer by sea and by air of arms and materiel to terrorist organizations and groups that continue to thwart the Libyan people and claim lives.

5. To enable the diplomatic representatives of the legitimate institutions, namely the House of Representatives and the Government established by it, to fulfil their functions in accordance with the relevant international instruments.

6. To express its grave concern at the continuation of armed confrontations and the increasing activity of non-State militias, and to denounce, in particular, the heinous crime perpetrated against Egyptian nationals in the town of Sirte and the bombings that killed dozens of Libyans and Egyptians in the town of Qubbah. Those bombings were perpetrated by ISIL with a view to making Libya into a third base, in addition to Iraq and Syria, plunging the entire region into a full-scale war.

7. To reiterate its call for support for the Libyan Government's efforts to secure its borders with neighbouring States with a view to stemming the flow of terrorist groups, drug and arms traffickers and illegal migrants.

(Summit resolution 624 — 26th ordinary session — 29 March 2015)

---

* The State of Qatar entered a reservation to the resolution.

United Nations A/69/862–S/2015/233

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
9 April 2015
English
Original: Arabic

General Assembly
Sixty-ninth session
Agenda item 107
Measures to eliminate international terrorism

Security Council
Seventieth year

Identical letters dated 2 April 2015 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On the morning of Wednesday, 1 April 2015, hundreds of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) terrorists, in coordination with terrorists from the Nusrah Front, entered the Yarmouk Palestine refugee camp. Their aim was to commit additional crimes against the camp's residents and force them to leave, and to wreck the local reconciliation agreement, which was meant to be signed on Friday, 3 April 2015. In so doing, the terrorists have endangered the lives of the camp's Palestinian and Syrian residents, whom they are now using as human shields. This crime is the latest in the series of crimes that have been committed by armed terrorist groups, including such groups as the Free Army, ISIL, the Nusrah Front and other armed terrorist groups affiliated with Al-Qaida, that are receiving their orders from foreign States and actors, and is consistent with the incidents that occurred in Busra al-Sham, Idlib and the village of Mab'ujah. All of this was facilitated by the Turkish and Jordanian regimes, which enabled the thousands of terrorists that they have trained to infiltrate Syria and commit crimes against innocent Syrian civilians.

Since the start of the conflict, the Syrian Arab Republic has strived assiduously to ensure that the Palestinians do not get dragged into the ongoing events, in order to protect them. However, the Nusrah Front, which is financed and supported by the Turkish and Qatari regimes and the Saudis, enabled the armed terrorist groups to infiltrate the Yarmouk camp and other locations and undermined the efforts of the Syrian Government to keep the Palestinians out of the current events. This action serves as clear evidence that the Nusrah Front, other terrorist groups and Israel have the same interests, namely, to work against the Palestinian cause and deny the Palestinians their right to return to the cities, villages and homes that were usurped from them in occupied Palestine.

The armed terrorist groups stormed the Yarmouk camp more than two years ago, occupying it and besieging it from within. They have killed its residents, taken their property and displaced the majority of them. The terrorists have also prevented

assistance from being brought in to the camp's residents, and that has led to tremendous human suffering. In response, the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic, in cooperation with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and some non-governmental organizations, has sought to deliver humanitarian and relief supplies to beneficiaries inside the camp. The delivery of such supplies has taken place in the presence of representatives of all the Palestinian organizations. From 30 December 2014 until the date on which this latest crime was committed, the above-mentioned parties together managed to deliver 61,882 food parcels and 11,618 health packages. They did so despite incessant sniping by the armed terrorist groups at humanitarian teams. In addition, some 4,856 ill persons were evacuated, so that they could receive appropriate treatment. For the second successive day, sniper and rocket fire from the armed terrorist groups has prevented residents from reaching the aid distribution point. The distribution of assistance to the camp's besieged residents has therefore stopped.

The fact that the Nusrah Front facilitated the entry of the terrorist group ISIL into parts of the camps is undeniable evidence that those organizations are exchanging roles, as circumstances dictate, and confirms the close ties between them. It also exposes the reality behind the image that some are trying to paint of the Nusrah Front as being the "moderate armed opposition" and undermines the efforts of the ruling regimes in Doha, Riyadh, Ankara, Amman and Tel Aviv to promote the idea that the Nusrah Front can be rehabilitated, so that they can then use it to implement their agendas. Such efforts are in stark violation of Security Council resolutions under which that organization is designated a terrorist entity.

Given that Palestine refugee camps must be given special humanitarian treatment, and in view of the suffering that the Palestinian people have endured as a result of the ongoing Israeli occupation of its land and the denial of its inalienable rights, the Syrian Arab Republic calls on the United Nations and the Security Council to intervene immediately and put pressure on Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Israel and Jordan, which are financing, sponsoring and supporting the terrorists, to withdraw their armed terrorists from the Yarmouk camp, in order to safeguard the lives and preserve the safety of Palestinian civilians. The withdrawal of the terrorists would also allow humanitarian and relief supplies to continue to reach camp residents, who are suffering from the terrorists' blockade and tyranny, and would allow the reconciliation agreement to be signed.

I should be grateful if the present letter could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 107, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Haydar **Ali Ahmad**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

United Nations S/2015/234

Security Council

Distr.: General
6 April 2015
English
Original: French

Letter dated 31 March 2015 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to refer to the exchange of letters of 20 and 24 December 2013 (S/2013/764 and S/2013/765) with the President of the Security Council concerning the deployment of a static United Nations guard unit to strengthen the security of the compounds of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) and the United Nations Support Office for the African Union Mission in Somalia (UNSOA) located in Mogadishu.

As indicated in these letters, in addition to the protection provided by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the Somali National Security Forces, the Council took note of the proposed arrangements for the establishment of a United Nations guard unit that would form part of the overall security concept by providing "inner ring" static protection for UNSOM and UNSOA facilities and installations in Mogadishu.

The Council authorized for this purpose the deployment of a guard battalion composed of static guard companies, an extraction and reinforcement team and an adequately composed logistics support company (410 in total), to be provided as contingents by Member States, with the following functions:

(a) Provide static security, patrols and access control for UNSOM and UNSOA facilities and installations in Mogadishu, including should UNSOM move outside Mogadishu International Airport;

(b) Act as a deterrent against possible attacks by extremist elements on those facilities and installations;

(c) Provide rapid extraction capability within Mogadishu International Airport;

(d) Support AMISOM and the Somali National Security Forces in extracting and relocating United Nations personnel who are outside the airport area in the event that they are under imminent threat of physical violence.

I take this opportunity to express my appreciation for the support and assistance provided by the African Union and the Federal Government of Somalia to the United Nations in this regard.

In my letter of 20 December 2013, I expressed my intention to review the continuing need for the presence of the United Nations guard unit on an annual basis by conducting a security assessment. In this context, and following the attack

Please recycle

on the Mogadishu International Airport of 25 December 2014, the United Nations reviewed the current security arrangements for the UNSOM and UNSOA facilities and installations in Mogadishu. This review highlighted an increased level of threat as well as increases in the number and size of compounds needing protection, and identified additional security requirements that cannot be addressed at the current troop level of 410.

Based on this security assessment, I intend to increase the strength of the guard unit in Mogadishu to a total of 530 personnel, an increase of 120 troops. The additional troops will reinforce the existing battalion and will also be responsible for a new compound, namely, the United Nations guard unit base. This increase will be in line with the current concept of operations for the guard unit. The Federal Government of Somalia was notified on 18 March.

In accordance with the arrangements in the exchange of letters of 20 and 24 December 2013, should other situations warrant the use of one or more additional guard unit(s), especially in regions other than Mogadishu, I will revert to the Council with advice on the supplementary measures that may be required. I also intend to continue to review the continuing need for the presence of the United Nations guard unit on an annual basis by conducting a yearly security assessment.

A protocol of amendment to the status-of-mission agreement for UNSOM, which would extend the necessary legal protection to the guard unit and to the State or States contributing contingents, is still under negotiation with the Government of Somalia.

Pending its conclusion and entry into force, it is to be understood that the provisions of the model status-of-forces agreement between the United Nations and host countries (A/45/594, annex) that apply to, and in respect of, the military personnel of national contingents assigned to the military component of a United Nations operation and to the property, funds and assets of the States contributing those contingents shall apply provisionally to, and in respect of, the military personnel of national contingents assigned to the guard unit and to the property, funds and assets of the States contributing those contingents.

I would be grateful if you could confirm that the above arrangements are acceptable to the Council. If so, it is my intention to take the necessary steps to increase the strength of the guard unit as soon as possible. In keeping with existing practice, I will, in due course, notify the Council of the concurrence of the troop-contributing countries whose units would be deployed to Mogadishu.

(*Signed*) **BAN** Ki-moon

United Nations S/2015/235

Security Council

Distr.: General
6 April 2015

Original: English

Letter dated 2 April 2015 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 31 March 2015 (S/2015/234) concerning your intention to increase the strength of the guard unit in Mogadishu to a total of 530 personnel has been brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council. They take note of the information contained in your letter and the intention expressed therein.

(*Signed*) Dina **Kawar**
President of the Security Council

15-05395 (E) 060415

Please recycle

United Nations A/69/872–S/2015/236

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
17 April 2015
English
Original: Arabic

General Assembly
Sixty-ninth session
Agenda items 68 (c) and 107

Promotion and protection of human rights: human rights situations and reports of special rapporteurs and representatives

Measures to eliminate international terrorism

Security Council
Seventieth year

Identical letters dated 3 April 2015 from the Permanent Mission of Jordan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

The Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan rejects in whole and in part the false allegations and unacceptable accusations made against Jordan in the identical letters dated 2 April 2015 from the Permanent Mission of Syria to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council regarding the recent developments in the Palestine refugee camp of Yarmouk.

Jordan stresses that the Syrian Government bears full responsibility for the Syrian crisis, the suffering of the civilians in Syria and the deteriorating security and humanitarian situation caused by its actions. The Syrian Government has committed serious violations of human rights principles and international humanitarian law, and has carried out systematic crimes against its own people in all their diverse components. It has facilitated the spread of terrorism and extremism. It has besieged certain areas, denying access to humanitarian and medical assistance in an act of collective punishment against its own people.

Accordingly, Jordan calls on the international community, particularly the Security Council, to bring pressure to bear on the Syrian Government to end its violations and comply with the relevant Security Council resolutions, including resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014) and 2199 (2015); the relevant General Assembly resolutions, including resolution 69/189; and international humanitarian law and human rights principles.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter issued as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 68 (c) and 107, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Dina **Kawar**
Permanent Representative

15-06108 (E) 210415 220415

Please recycle

United Nations S/2015/237

Security Council

Distr.: General
7 April 2015

Original: English

Letter dated 2 April 2015 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to refer to Security Council resolution 2204 (2015), adopted on 24 February 2015, by which the Council decided to extend until 25 March 2016 the mandate of the Panel of Experts on Yemen and requested me to take the necessary administrative measures.

Accordingly, I wish to inform you that, after consulting with the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014), I have appointed the following experts:

Mr. Khaled Fattah, regional (Netherlands)
Ms. Virginia Hill, armed groups (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland)
Ms. Lucy Mathieson, international humanitarian law (New Zealand)
Mr. Joel Salek, finance (Colombia)

I have designated Ms. Virginia Hill to serve as Coordinator of the Panel of Experts.

I should be grateful if you would bring this matter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **BAN** Ki-moon

15-05421 (E) 070415

Please recycle